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SUMMARY 
 
 
The subject of the present treatise concerns termination of employment contracts 
that are effected as a result of an employee’s incapacity on the grounds of ill-health 
or injury.  Every employee has the right not to be dismissed unfairly.  The Labour 
Relations Act, 1995 recognises three grounds on which termination of employment 
might be legitimate.  These include the conduct of the employee, the capacity of the 
employee and the operational requirements of the employer’s business.   
 
However, fundamental to any contract of employment is the obligation that rests on 
an employee not to be absent from work without justification.  The Incapacity Code 
and Procedure in respect of Ill-health or Injury applicable to Educators is contained in 
Schedule 1 to the Employment of Educators Act, 1998.  In addition there are 
collective agreements which are the products of collective bargaining that are also 
applicable to all categories of employees employed in the public education sector.  
Notably, PSCBC Resolution 7 of 2000 forms part of the subject of our discussion. 
 
The Department of Education determined the use of independent Health-risk 
Managers to provide advice on the management of incapacity leave and ill-health 
retirement, thereby ensuring objective and impartial evaluation which are largely 
acceptable to employees and their labour representatives.  This is the Policy and 
Procedure on Incapacity Leave and Ill-Health Retirement in the Public Service.  The 
appointed Health-risk Managers make recommendations to the Head of Department 
who thereafter implement the recommendations and deal with issues of a case to 
absolute finality.  More importantly, the Policy and Procedure for incapacity leave and 
ill-health retirement in the Public Service is issued in terms of legislation, that is, 
section 3(3) of the Public Service Act, 1994 and therefore is not a collective 
agreement.  Under the circumstances, it is not always easy to determine a real 
dispute and an issue in dispute.  Because of this uncertainty arbitrators often found 
that bargaining councils have no jurisdiction to entertain these disputes, while on the 
other hand some arbitrators opined that bargaining councils do have jurisdiction. 
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In this treatise the general principles of the employment contract, the legislative 
framework applicable in the public education sector in determining an application for 
temporary incapacity leave and ill-health retirement and procedural and substantive 
issues in the termination of employment contract due to ill-health are considered and 
explained.  The legal questions around the issue of discretion exercised by the Head 
of Department in granting or declining applications for ill-health are also examined.  
The primary aim of the treatise is to provide a clear exposition of the rather 
complicated law relating to incapacity due to ill-health and injury in public education. 
 
1 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
It is submitted that the subject of discussion will focus on termination of employment 
contracts that are affected as a result of an employee’s incapacity on the grounds of 
ill-health or injury.  Every employee has the right not to be dismissed unfairly.  Over 
the years, international labour standards in the form of ILO Conventions have played 
a formative role in the development of South African Labour Law.  The Labour 
Relations Act, 1995 recognizes three grounds on which termination of employment 
might be legitimate.  These include the conduct of the employee, the capacity of the 
employee and the operational requirements of the employer’s business.1 
 
Section 23 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 2(hereinafter referred to 
as the “Constitution”) provides that everyone has the right to fair labour practices.  
Section 33 of the Constitution provides that everyone has the right to administrative 
action that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair.  The Labour Relations Act3 
(hereinafter referred to as the “LRA”) refers employers, arbitrators and the Labour 
Court via section 188(2) to the Code of Good Practice: Dismissal4 (hereinafter 
referred to as the “Code”), which forms the eighth Schedule to the Act, and informs 
that any person evaluating the fairness of a dismissal must have regard to it when 
deciding on the fairness of a dismissal.  It also becomes important to mention that, 
firstly arbitrators and the Labour Court are not bound to follow the Code meticulously 
and literally; secondly, employers and organized labour are free to depart from the 
Code by establishing their own guidelines.  Discretion and voluntarism remain.  The 
Code does not lay down fixed norms to prescribe inflexible rules.  The flexibility is 
borne out by Item 1(3), which provides that the key principle in this Code is that 
employers and employees should treat one another with mutual respect. 
 
                                                          
1  S 188. 
2  Act 108 of 1998. 
3  Act 66 of 1995. 
4  Sch 8 of the LRA. 
2 
However, fundamental to any contract of employment is the obligation that rests on 
an employee not to be absent from work without justification.  The Department of 
Education employs two categories of employees.  These are educators employed in 
terms of the Employment of Educators Act5 and non-teaching staff employed in terms 
of the Public Service Act6.  The Incapacity Code and Procedure in respect of ill-health 
or injury applicable to educators is contained in Schedule 1 to the Employment of 
Educators Act, 1998.  I find it worthwhile also to mention the fact that Item 1(2) of the 
Code of Good Practice as contained in Schedule 8 to the LRA provides that this 
Code is not intended as a substitute for disciplinary codes and procedures where 
these are the subject of collective agreements, or the outcome of joint decision-
making by an employer and a workplace forum.  In addition there are collective 
agreements which are the products of collective bargaining that are also applicable to 
all categories of employees employed in the public-education sector.  Notably, 
PSCBC7 Resolution 7 of 2000 will form part of the subject of our discussion. 
 
Furthermore, it is equally important to remember that the importance of reducing 
short- and long-term sick absenteeism as well as possible permanent incapacity 
amongst the workforce, through the concept of early intervention, workforce 
management, and rehabilitation is becoming more and more critical.  Failure by the 
employer to manage ill-health at the workplace has a potential to lead to allegations 
of unfair labour practices and other labour-law risks.  In view of the above risks, it has 
become imperative for the Department of Education to at the very least, distance 
itself from direct evaluation of incapacity and disability applications, and place such 
complex functions in the hands of independent experts.  In line with the above 
imperatives, the Department of Education determined the use of independent Health-
Risk Managers to provide advice on the management of incapacity leave and ill-
health retirement, thereby ensuring objective and impartial evaluations which are 
acceptable to employees and their labour representatives.  This is in terms of the 
Policy and Procedure on Incapacity Leave and Ill-Health Retirement in the Public 
Service (hereinafter referred to as PILIR).  In this regard, the appointed Health-Risk 
Managers make recommendations to the Head of Department who thereafter 
                                                          
5  Act 76 of 1998. 
6  Act 103 of 1994. 
7  Public Service Coordinating Bargaining Council. 
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implement the recommendations from the Health-Risk Managers and deal with the 
issues of a case to absolute finality. 
 
A serious challenge faced by the Department of Education is a high volume of 
employees, particularly educators, taking long and unending sick leaves.  In some 
instances it is argued that as a result of the Department’s taking too long to respond 
to employees’ applications for sick leave, some employees take advantage and 
explore this inefficiency by the Department and submit a plethora of sick certificates.  
 
More importantly, the Policy and Procedure for Incapacity Leave and Ill-Health 
Retirement in the Public Service is issued under a statute, that is, section 3(3) of the 
Public Service Act8 and therefore is not a collective agreement. As It has already 
been mentioned earlier on, there are also collective agreements which also play a 
significant role in determining applications for incapacity leave and ill-health 
retirement in the public-education sector.  This is an issue that has been a nightmare 
for the employer, employees, unions and arbitrators.  Under the circumstances, it is 
not always easy to determine a real dispute and an issue in dispute.  Because of this 
uncertainty arbitrators often found that bargaining councils had no jurisdiction to 
entertain these disputes, while on the other hand some arbitrators argued that 
bargaining councils did have jurisdiction. 
 
Against this background, it becomes imperative to note that our topic is threefold.  It 
is common cause that the nature of applications for ill-health are subdivided into two 
categories, that is, temporary incapacity leave (including long) and ill-health 
retirement.  On the other hand we have service terminations which are the outcomes 
of incapacity-related hearings.  The legal question regarding the earlier part is about 
the fairness of the decision of the Head of Department or his delegate to decline or 
grant these applications for temporary incapacity leave or ill-health retirement.  These 
decisions, one can safely say, are taken in accordance with the provisions of a 
regulation, and are thus discretionary.  In the Department of Education Schedule 1 to 
the Employment of Educators Act, 1998, read together with the Policy and Procedure 
for Temporary Incapacity Leave and Ill-Health Retirement in the Public Service 
                                                          
8  Act 103 of 1994. 
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(PILIR), provides a procedural right to employees faced with incapacity to perform 
their duties due to ill-health or injury.  It should be noted that the mere fact that 
investigation may confirm the incapacity due to ill-health does not mean that 
termination of employment is an automatic outcome.  In this premise, the employer 
has a duty to investigate securing alternative employment which may include 
amongst others a transfer. 
 
In view of the above, and in terms of many disputes referred to the bargaining 
councils, a question that always arises is whether the discretion to decline 
applications by the Head of Department is on the basis of administrative-law 
principles or interpretation and application of collective agreement. 
 
For the purpose of this study it also becomes necessary to understand what 
termination of employment contract (dismissal) entails in the context of ill-health.  A 
close look will be taken at the fairness of dismissal in cases of incapacity based on ill-
health.  Our courts have held that the substantive fairness of a dismissal based on 
incapacity due to ill-health, depends on the question whether the employee can fairly 
be expected to continue in the employment relationship, bearing in mind the interests 
of the employee and the employer and the equities of the case.  Other factors to be 
considered would include the nature of the incapacity, the cause of the incapacity, 
the likelihood of recovery and the likelihood of improvement or indeed recurrence.  
The period of absence and its effect on the employer’s operations must also be 
considered as well as the effect of the employee’s disability on other employees.  
The employee’s work record and length of service must also be considered. 
 
Schedule 1 to the Employment of Educators Act, 1998 read together with PILIR, 
provides that the employer must ascertain whether the employee is capable of 
performing the work that he/she was employed to do, and if not, the extent to which 
he/she is unable to perform those duties.  The employee is entitled to participate in 
this investigation, which may require further medical investigation, and the employee 
may also be asked to demonstrate his/her ability.  If the employee’s duties cannot be 
adapted in such a way that the employee is able to fulfil those duties, and no 
alternative position is available, then dismissal is justified.  Thus, it is obvious that the 
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principles of procedural and substantive fairness apply to such dismissals, as they 
apply also to all types of dismissal. 
 
This very important issue will be considered in the following manner in this treatise: 
 
Chapter 2 of this study deals with the general principles of the contract of 
employment and overview of the termination of employment contract due to ill-health.  
Except for the usual requirements that have to be fulfilled in order to ensure a valid 
contract, the essential elements of the employment contract have to be included.  
These elements include consensus concerning specified work and a remuneration 
which must be determinable.  When the employee is employed, the parties must 
agree on the type of work he/she is to do.  However, the illness of an employee does 
not normally terminate the contract of employment, but an employer is entitled to 
dismiss the employee, and therefore to terminate the contract, if the absence due to 
illness continues for an unreasonable period. 
 
Chapter 3 deals with the legislative framework in determining applications for 
temporary incapacity leave and ill-health retirement.  The Chapter explores legal 
compliance with the prevailing labour legislation applicable in the public-education 
sector in dealing with these applications.  Case law developed in recent years 
relating to these applications will also be a subject of our discussion. 
 
Chapter 4 deals with the procedural and substantive fairness of the termination of 
employment contract due to ill-health. 
 
Chapter 5 will examine whether the decision or a discretion exercised by the Head of 
Department in granting or declining applications for ill-health is administrative action 
or interpretation and application of collective agreement.  This legal question will be 
highlighted with reference to case law handed down by our courts. 
 
Chapter 6 draws the conclusion and recommendations with specific reference to 
legal compliance on labour legislation applicable in the public-education sector 
dealing with applications for temporary incapacity leave and ill-health retirement.  
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CHAPTER 2 
THE CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT 
 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
The contract of employment remains of critical importance because, except in some 
rare cases, the legislation that I shall be dealing with in this study applies only to 
parties to such contracts. 
 
The legal relationship between an employer and an employee is created by an 
agreement in terms of which the employee undertakes to place his or her personal 
services at the disposal of the employer for an indefinite or fixed period in return for a 
determinable wage.  Under common law, the parties were free to agree on any terms 
they pleased, subject only to the requirements of the law of good morals.  Once such 
an agreement has been concluded, the parties acquire certain rights and incur 
certain duties.  Failure by either party to perform its duties under the contract gives 
the other party the right to either enforce the contract, or to cancel the contract.  At 
common law, the parties’ rights and duties were determined exclusively by the 
express and implied provisions of the employment contract.  Such contracts could be 
terminated at will by either party by giving the notice required, or summarily, if the 
other party was in breach.  
 
Today, the contractual freedom of employers and employees has been considerably 
restricted by legislation, which supersedes individual contracts of employment in 
many respects.  For example, the Basic Conditions of Employment Act9 expressly 
states that its provisions are deemed to form part of an employee’s contract unless a 
more favourable term has been agreed to. In terms of the Labour Relations Act,10 
certain collective agreements override the terms of individual contracts of 
employment.  However, the general principles of the contract of employment and as 
                                                          
9  Act 75 of 1997. 
10  Act 66 of 1995. 
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well an overview of the termination of employment contract due to ill-health will form 
part of our discussion in this chapter. 
 
2.2 BASIC PRINCIPLES OF THE CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT 
 
The contract of employment is the foundation of the relationship between an 
employee and an employer.  According to Grogan,11 unless the parties have 
concluded an agreement that satisfies the requirements of a contract of employment, 
no employment relationship comes into existence, and the parties do not fall within 
the scope of the labour legislation discussed elsewhere in this treatise.  A number of 
issues and principles have to be borne in mind when considering the employment 
contract as a whole.  It is, for example, always necessary to be borne in mind that the 
employment relationship is not one of equality; the employer, as a rule, will have 
considerably more economic power, dictating the terms and conditions of 
employment to the employee.12 
 
In Member of Executive Committee, Department of Health, Eastern Cape v Odendaal 
the court held that the contract of employment (whether verbally or in writing) 
constitutes the basis or sine qua non for existence of the employment relationship 
between an employer and an employee.  Once the two contracting parties have 
agreed on the core elements of the employment contract which is an agreement that 
the employee will place his or her labour at the disposal of and under the control of 
the employer in exchange for remuneration, then an employment relationship will be 
created. 
 
The fact that the contract of employment is important also appears from the decision 
in Member of Executive Committee, Department of Roads & Transport, Limpopo 
Province v Mahango,13 where the court pointed out that the common law of contract 
of employment should be developed in such a way that it conforms with the 
constitutional right to fair labour practices.  The contract of employment remains the 
                                                          
11  Grogan Employment Rights (2010) 43. 
12  Basson, Christianson, Dekker, Garbers, Le Roux, Mischke and Strydom Essential Labour Law 
(2009) 21. 
13  (2008) 29 ILJ 272. 
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basis of the employment relationship.  An employment relationship cannot exist 
without the conclusion of a contract of service.  After the decision of the 
Constitutional Court in Transnet Ltd v Chirwa14 a dismissed employee no longer has 
the option of proceedings with common-law remedy for contractual damages based 
on a breach of contract, with the result that the dismissed employee is obliged to 
follow the dispute procedures as set out in the LRA.  The Constitutional Court has 
nonetheless made an important statement regarding the importance of the 
employment contract as the source of the power to terminate the contract of 
employment. 
 
2.3 THE DEFINITION AND ESSENTIALS OF THE CONTRACT OF 
EMPLOYMENT 
 
Grogan15 defines a contract of employment as an agreement between the two parties 
in terms of which one of the parties (employee) undertakes to place his or her 
personal services at the disposal of the other party (employer) for an indefinite or 
determined period in return for a fixed or ascertainable remuneration, and which 
entitles the employer to define the employee’s duties and to control the manner in 
which the employee discharges them. 
 
From the above it can be deduced that a contract of employment is: 
 
 Voluntary 
 Between two parties 
 The employee agreeing to perform certain specified and/ or implied duties for 
the employer 
 For an indefinite or specified period 
 In return for payment of a fixed or ascertainable remuneration to the 
employee 
 Giving the employer a right to direct the employee as to the manner in which 
his or her duties are carried out. 
 
                                                          
14  [2008] 2 BLLR 97 (CC). 
15  Supra. 
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Grogan further demonstrates that at the time of contracting there must have been 
consensus between the parties and both must have had a serious intention to create 
mutual rights and duties to which they would be legally bound, and each must have 
been aware that the other party must have had this intention.  In the circumstances, 
each party must have the capacity to conclude the contract and must also be legally 
capable of performing the act which gave rise to the formation of contract.  Each 
party must be legally competent to perform the rights and duties assumed, and it 
must be physically possible for them to assume their obligations.  
 
2.4  THE DEFINITION OF AN “EMPLOYEE” 
 
In terms of section 213 of the Labour Relations Act16 an employee is  
 
(a)  any person, excluding an independent contractor who works for another 
person or for the State and who receives or is entitled to receive, any 
remuneration; and  
 
(b)  any other person who in any manner assists in carrying on or conducting the 
business of an employer.  
 
Basson17 shows that for the first time, the LRA included employees in the Public 
Service and in the education sector.  Before 1993, people working for the State were 
excluded from the ambit of labour legislation.  During 1993, two pieces of legislation 
(the Public Service Relations Act18 and Education Labour Relations Act19) came into 
force, giving employees in these sectors the right to belong to a trade union and 
bargain collectively.  But now, in terms of the LRA, these employees also fall within 
the ambit of labour legislation and the state, in respect of the public sector and 
educators, is now regarded as the employer.  It becomes imperative to mention the 
fact that in this piece of study focus will be on these types of employees employed in 
the public service and/ or in the education sector. 
                                                          
16  66 of 1995. 
17  Supra. 
18  102 of 1993. 
19  146 of 1993. 
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2.5  TERMINATION OF THE EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT 
 
According to Grogan,20 as in the case of all contracts, the contract of employment 
may end in various ways, some consensual, others unilateral.  The methods of 
termination of employment contracts are as follows: 
 
 On expiration of the agreed period 
 On the completion of the specified task 
 By notice 
 By summary termination 
 By repudiation 
 By mutual agreement 
 By death of either party 
 By insolvency 
 By supervening impossibility of performance 
 By State action 
 And by operation of law. 
 
The impact of the current Labour Relations Act on the common-law employment 
contract is particularly significant in circumstances where the employer wishes to 
terminate the employment contract through dismissal.  Although it is in terms of 
contractual principles lawful to terminate a contract of employment by giving the other 
party the required contractual notice, it is, however, trite in the labour-law context that 
the lawful termination of the contract does not necessarily mean that the termination 
of the employment contract is fair.  In Member of Executive Committee, Department 
of Health, Eastern Cape v Odendaal21 the court held that labour legislation had 
therefore supplemented the common-law principles regulating the termination of a 
contract of employment with the import of the requirement of fairness.  The 
requirement of a fair termination does not, however, imply that employers need not to 
adhere to the requirement in respect of the lawful termination of the contract of 
                                                          
20  Workplace Law (2008) 80-86. 
21  (2009) 30 ILJ 2093 (LC). 
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employment.  From the foregoing it therefore does not appear that the LRA has 
overtaken the common-law in respect of the termination of the contract of 
employment although, as already indicated, it is accepted that the fairness principles 
embodied in the LRA have softened the harsh effects of a mere lawful termination of 
the contract may have.  In Amazulu Football Club v Hellenic Football Club,22 it was 
held that it did seem that it might safely be stated that the fairness requirements 
embodied in the LRA operated at least in respect of the termination of the contract 
alongside the contractual principles regulating the termination of the contract of 
employment. 
 
For the purpose of this Chapter, our discussion will be limited to a termination of 
employment contract by supervening impossibility of performance and a brief 
overview of termination of the employment contract due to ill-health.   
 
2.5.1  BY SUPERVENING IMPOSSIBILITY OF PERFORMANCE 
 
According to Grogan,23 if either party becomes permanently unable to perform his or 
her obligations under the contract, or is unable to perform those obligations for a 
period that is unreasonable as far as the other is concerned, the other party is 
entitled to terminate the contract on the ground of such non-performance.  Although 
sickness or disability may relieve employees of the duty to tender service for a limited 
period, neither constitutes a valid ground at common law for the employer to 
terminate the contract unless it endures for an unreasonable period.  
 
Under the Basic Conditions of Employment Act,24 employees are entitled to the 
period of leave prescribed by the Act, subject only to proper medical certification. 
Once they have exhausted their statutory entitlement, the common law applies.  This 
means that the employer may terminate the contract when the employee’s continued 
absence becomes unreasonable in the light of the employer’s reasonable 
expectations.  Unless the contract of employment or collective agreement provides 
for a longer period, once the statutory period of sick leave is exhausted, the 
                                                          
22  (2002) ILJ 2357 (ARB) at 2364G-H. 
23  Workplace Law 85. 
24  Supra. 
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employee is not entitled to claim payment for the balance of the period of absence.  
The effect of an absence in excess of the statutory period is analogous to a 
suspension of the contract unless the employer elects to cancel.  
 
Grogan further demonstrates that it has been suggested that employees may be 
dismissed for absence from work due to sickness or disability even if they have not 
yet exhausted their statutory or contractual entitlement to sick leave.  The 
requirements set by the Labour Relations Act for dismissal for ill-health are explained 
in paragraph that follows. 
 
2.5.2  AN OVERVIEW OF THE TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT 
DUE TO ILL-HEALTH 
 
In the event of an employee becoming incapable of performing his/her work, an 
employer may be justified in terminating his/her employment.  An employee may 
become incapacitated due to a variety of reasons, including injury or degenerative 
disease; therefore sensitivity and discretion must be exercised by the employer in 
these circumstances.  Termination can be considered if the employee remains 
unable to perform the inherent requirements of the job, and after applications for 
temporary incapacity leave have been considered.  In considering dismissal, an 
employer should proceed on the basis that termination is the last resort, rather than it 
being inevitable.  The employer should first consider the following: 
 
 The inherent requirements of the employee’s position 
 The extent to which he or she can no longer perform these requirements 
 Whether he or she will be able to perform these requirements in the 
foreseeable future 
 Whether the employee’s injury or condition is improving, stable or 
deteriorating, and 
 Whether the employee is still productive despite the fact that he or she may 
not be fulfilling the inherent requirements of his/her position.  An employee 
who is still productive may not be able to be justifiably dismissed, depending 
on number of factors.  
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These will be discussed in more detail in Chapters that follow (Chapter 4). 
 
Once these have been considered, the employer will be in a better position to 
determine whether the employee’s position can be modified, or whether they would 
be better suited to a permanent alternative position.  The employee should always be 
made aware that termination is a possible consideration.  This should be done in the 
form of a meeting, where the employee is allowed a representative and opportunity to 
respond and make suggestions. 
 
It is likely that medical evidence will be required by the employer to help to determine 
the extent of the incapacity.  It is preferable that such evidence is in the form of a 
current, written medical opinion or report, and should request that such a report be 
directed at the inherent requirements of the employee’s position and his/her 
capabilities of performing these currently and in the foreseeable future.  If it is 
apparent that the employee’s employment cannot continue after the above process 
has been followed, the employer may be able to terminate employment.  
 
Employee absence can be a sensitive and complex issue.  It is vital that employers 
make every effort to assist and accommodate the employee in order to prevent 
termination.  If termination is considered, it is essential that the correct process be 
followed to avoid claims for unfair dismissals, unlawful termination or adverse action. 
 
2.6  CONCLUSION 
 
From the above it can be deduced that the contract of employment remains of critical 
importance.  The contract of employment is the foundation of the relationship 
between an employee and employer.  It has been shown that a contract of 
employment is an agreement between two parties in terms of which one of the 
parties undertakes to place his or her personal services at the disposal of the 
employer for an indefinite or determined period in return for a fixed or ascertainable 
remuneration, and which entitles the employer to define the employee’s duties and to 
control the manner in which the employee discharges them.  The impact of the 
current Labour Relations Act on the common-law employment contract is particularly 
14 
significant in circumstances where the employer wishes to terminate the employment 
contract through dismissal. 
 
The employer is required to balance both fairness to the employee and the 
requirements of the business. In deciding to dismiss, the employer must be able to 
justify its decision both substantively and procedurally. In other words, is this a 
decision that a fair and reasonable employer could have made, given the 
circumstances? 
15 
CHAPTER 3 
THE LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK AND COMPLIANCE ON 
APPLICATIONS FOR ILL-HEALTH IN THE PUBLIC EDUCATION 
SECTOR 
 
 
3.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
The previous chapter dealt with the contract of employment and among other things, 
an overview of the termination of employment contract due to ill-health in the public-
education sector.  However, section 23 of the Constitution25 provides that everyone 
has the right to fair labour practices.  The Labour Relations Act26 refers employers, 
arbitrators and Labour Courts to the Code of Good Practice: Dismissal, which forms 
the eighth schedule to the Act, and informs that any person evaluating the fairness of 
a dismissal must have regard to it when deciding on the fairness of a dismissal.  
However, fundamental to any contract of employment is the obligation that rests on 
an employee not to be absent from work without justification. 
 
A serious challenge faced by the Department of Education is a high volume of 
employees, particularly educators, taking long and unending sick leaves.  For the 
purpose of this study a close look will be taken at the legislative framework in 
determining applications for temporary incapacity leave and ill-health retirement.  The 
chapter explores legal compliance on the prevailing labour legislation applicable in 
the public-education sector.  Case law relating to these applications will also be a 
subject of my discussion. 
 
3.2 ABSENTEEISM AND THE LAW 
 
Every employee has the right not to be unfairly dismissed.  The Labour Relations Act 
recognizes three grounds on which termination of employment might be legitimate.  
These include the conduct of the employee, the capacity of the employee and the 
                                                          
25  Act 108 of 1996. 
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operational requirement of the employer’s business.  In the previous chapter it has 
been shown that the employment contract contains three fundamental 
characteristics: 
 
 An agreement to make personal services available to the employer 
 The right to be paid for services rendered to the  employer, 
 Agreement to be under control and direction of the employer. 
 
At common law the parties’ rights and duties were determined exclusively by the 
express and implied provisions of the employment contract.  Such contracts could be 
terminated at will by either party giving the notice required, or summarily, if the other 
party was in breach.  In this context and historically, the contract of employment did 
not make provision for payment in the event that the employee was too ill or injured 
to work.  Consequently, if the employee did not arrive at work, because he/she was 
sick, not only did they not get paid, but the contract of employment could be 
terminated. 
 
Today, the contractual freedom of employers and employees has been considerably 
restricted by legislation, which supersedes individual contracts in many respects.  
This inequality between the employer and the employee in respect of sick leave was, 
however, tackled by the legislature.  In this regard the legislature eventually 
addressed the difficulties faced by employees by enacting legislation that required 
the employer to grant the employee leave days on which the employee was too ill to 
work, and pay the employee for days in question.  
 
Pieces of legislation in the above connection will be discussed in paragraphs that 
follow. 
 
3.2.1 THE BASIC CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT ACT27 
 
Section 22 of the Act provides that employees are entitled to one day’s paid sick 
leave for every 26 days worked during the first four months of employment, and 
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thereafter to the number of days they normally work in six weeks during each 36-
month cycle.  The right to sick leave accrues only when the employee cannot work 
because of incapacity, which means inability to work owing to sickness and or injury. 
In terms of section 23 of the Act, employees are entitled to paid sick leave if they are 
absent for more than two days, or for more than one day if more than two days’ 
absence occurred in a space of eight weeks, but only if the employees produce a 
medical certificate issued by a medical practitioner or a person certified to diagnose 
and treat patients and who is registered with some statutory body.  No medical 
certificate is required for an isolated day’s sick leave. If the employee lives on the 
employer’s premises, the employer must provide reasonable assistance if necessary 
in order to enable the employee to obtain a medical certificate. 
 
3.2.2  THE LABOUR RELATIONS ACT28 
 
The Code of Good Practice forms the eighth schedule to the Labour Relations Act.  
The Code states that an illness or injury of a serious nature may be a valid reason for 
dismissal.  It goes further to state that the specific circumstances of each case must 
be considered to determine the fairness of dismissal.  Item 10 sets out general 
guidelines for dealing with employees who are unable to perform due to illness or 
injury. Incapacity on the grounds of ill-health or injury may be temporary or 
permanent.  If an employee is temporarily unable to work, the employer should 
investigate the extent of incapacity or the injury.  If an employee is likely to be absent 
for a time that is unreasonably long, the employer should investigate all possible 
alternatives short of dismissal.  When alternatives are considered, relevant factors 
might include: 
 
 The nature of the job 
 The period of absence 
 The seriousness of the illness or injury 
 The possibility of securing a temporary replacement for the ill or injured 
employee. 
 
                                                          
28  Sch 8: Code of Good Practice: Dismissal: Item 10. 
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These procedural aspects will be dealt with in more detail in Chapter 4 of this study.  
As it has been already indicated this study will focus on termination of employment 
contract due to ill-health or injury in the public-education sector.  This will lead to a 
brief look at the legislative framework that is applicable in the public-education sector. 
 
3.3  LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK IN THE PUBLIC- EDUCATION SECTOR 
 
The Eastern Cape Department of Basic Education has been flooded with a number 
of disputes relating to Temporary Incapacity Leave and Ill-Health Retirements.  Of 
course, absenteeism in the Department of Education has reached alarming levels.  
One needs to understand that the obligation to investigate incapacity due to ill-health 
emanates from the collective agreements, leave determination and applicable 
employment legislation.  For the purpose of this study an overview analysis of 
Schedule 129 to the Employment of Educators Act30 will be conducted.  Chapter J as 
contained in the Personnel Administration Measures to the Employment of Educators 
Act will also be the subject of our discussion.  Public-Service employees have the 
benefit of 36 days’ “normal” sick leave in a fixed three-year sick-leave cycle.  Should 
employees require more than 36 days’ sick leave in the sick-leave cycle, he/she have 
the opportunity to access Temporary Incapacity leave in terms of the Policy and 
Procedure on Incapacity Leave and Ill-Health Retirement, hereinafter referred to as 
“PILIR”.  Furthermore, bargaining councils’ collective agreements dealing with 
applications for incapacity leave will also be examined in paragraphs that follow. 
 
3.3.1 THE EMPLOYMENT OF EDUCATORS ACT31 
 
Section 3 of Schedule 1 to the Employment of Educators Act provides that if the 
employer is of the view that an educator is not performing in accordance with the 
post requirement that the educator has been employed to perform, as a result of poor 
health or injury, the employer must investigate the extent of the ill-health or injury.  It 
further states that in conducting the investigation the employer must give the 
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30  76 of 1998. 
31  76 of 1998: Sch 1: Incapacity Code and Procedure in respect of Ill-Health or Injury applicable to 
educators. 
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educator, or the trade-union representative of the educator or fellow employee, the 
opportunity to state the case of the educator and to be heard on all issues that the 
employer is investigating.  Subject to section 7 of the Employment Equity Act,32 the 
employer must appoint at least one registered medical practitioner to examine the 
educator at the State’s expense and to report on the educator’s state of health.  
However, the educator is also entitled to nominate any other registered medical 
practitioner of his/her choice at the educator’s own expense to report on the 
educator’s state of health.  Both medical practitioners must provide the employer with 
reports on the nature and extent of the educator’s ill-health or injury, and whether it is 
temporary or permanent, as well as the expected period of the educator’s incapacity.  
Based on the medical reports the employer must determine whether or not the nature 
of the educator’s ill-health or injury is of a temporary or permanent nature, and the 
period of time that the educator is likely to be absent from work.  If the educator’s ill-
health or injury is of a permanent nature, the employer must investigate the 
possibility of: 
 
 Securing alternative employment for the educator 
 Adapting the duties or work circumstances of the educator to accommodate 
the educator’s ill-health or injury 
 Consider the termination of the educator’s services with effect from a date 
determined by the employer. 
 
If an educator refuses or fails to be subjected to an examination for a second opinion 
when requested to do so by the employer, the employer may initiate disciplinary 
proceedings against the educator in terms of the disciplinary code and procedure 
applicable to educators.  An in-depth analysis of the procedural requirements in this 
regard will be detailed in Chapter 4 of this study. 
 
3.3.2  PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION MEASURES33 
 
Chapter J of Personnel Administrative Measures provides an educator who has 
exhausted her or his sick-leave credit in a three-year cycle and who, according to the 
                                                          
32  55 of 1998. 
33  Ch J, paras 9 and 10 of Employment of Educators Act. 
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relevant medical practitioner, requires to be absent due to incapacity that is not 
permanent may be granted additional sick leave with full pay.  It further states that 
such a condition must have been certified in advance by the attending medical 
practitioner as a temporary incapacity except where conditions do not permit.  The 
Head of Department may require the educator to obtain a second opinion before 
granting approval for additional sick leave.  Expenditure in this regard will be met 
from the departmental budget.  The Head of Department may grant a maximum of 30 
consecutive working days’ leave with full pay during which period an investigation 
must be conducted into the nature and extent of the incapacity.  The investigation 
must be conducted in accordance with Item (10)(1) of Schedule 8 of the LRA, 1995.  
On the basis of the medical evidence, the Head of Department may approve the 
granting of additional sick leave days on conditions that she/he shall determine.  If an 
educator is of the view that she or he has been unfairly treated as regards the 
granting of additional sick leave, she/he has the right to follow the grievance 
procedure and the relevant dispute-resolution procedures in order to settle the 
matter.  
 
Educators whose degree of incapacity has been certified by a competent medical 
practitioner as permanent shall, with the approval of the Head of Department, be 
granted a maximum of 30 working days’ paid sick leave, or such additional number of 
days required by the employer to finalize processes that follow.  The employer shall, 
within 30 working days, ascertain the feasibility of:  
 
 Alternative employment 
 Adapting duties or work circumstances to accommodate the educator. 
 
An educator, whose degree of incapacity has been certified as permanent but who 
can still render a service, may, in terms of the applicable measures, be redeployed 
horizontally with retention of her or his benefits.  If the redeployment necessitates 
reallocation to a job of a lower grading, such actions should be explained well in 
advance, and the continued utilization of such an educator should, in this regard, be 
with her or his consent.  In instances where the educator’s redeployment entails 
retraining, the employer shall take requisite resources and potential returns into 
consideration before approving redeployment.  The redeployment of an educator’s 
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services should ensure the optimal utilization of her or his competencies and should 
not compromise service delivery.  If the employer or an educator is convinced that 
the educator will never be able to render an effective service at her or his level or 
rank, the educator may proceed with an application for termination of service due to 
ill-health. 
 
3.3.3  POLICY AND PROCEDURE ON INCAPACITY LEAVE AND ILL-HEALTH 
RETIREMENT 
 
As it has been shown elsewhere, the importance of reducing short- and long-term 
sick absenteeism as well as possible permanent incapacity amongst the workforce, 
through the concept of early intervention, workforce management and rehabilitation is 
becoming more and more critical.  Failure by the employer to manage incapacity at 
the workplace has a potential to lead to allegations of unfair labour practices and 
other labour-law risks.  In view of the above risks, it has become imperative for the 
Eastern Cape Department of Education to at the very least, distance itself from direct 
evaluation of incapacity and disability applications, and place such complex functions 
at the hands of independent experts.  In line with the above imperatives, the 
Department of Education determined the use of independent Health-Risk Managers, 
hereinafter referred to as “HRM’’, to provide advice on the management of incapacity 
leave and ill-health retirement, thereby ensuring objective and impartial evaluations 
which may be acceptable to employees and their labour representatives.  In this 
regard, the appointed Health-Risk Manager makes recommendations to the Head of 
Department who thereafter implemens the recommendations from HRM and deals 
with the issues of each case to absolute finality. 
 
As indicated earlier, public-service employees have the benefit of 36 days’ “normal” 
sick leave in a fixed three-year sick leave cycle.  Should employees require more 
than 36 days sick leave in the sick-leave cycle, he/she has the opportunity to access 
the system of Temporary Incapacity Leave.  This additional sick leave benefit is a 
privilege granted at the discretion of the employer, with due consideration of the 
medical evidence.  Where such employees qualify for such incapacity leave, they 
retain full salary for the duration of the incapacity leave, while the employer 
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undertakes to safeguard the employee’s job until such time that the employee returns 
to work. 
 
During normal sick leave, the only “sick” certificates that are acceptable are those 
from practitioners or persons who may diagnose and treat patients and who are 
registered with professional councils, i.e. 
 
 The Health Professions Councils of South Africa 
 The Allied Health Professions Council of South Africa 
 The South African Nursing Council. 
 
However, when an employee exceeds normal sick leave days of 36 working days in 
a sick-leave cycle, only “sick” certificates issued and signed by practitioners 
registered with Health Professional Council of South Africa who may then diagnose 
and treat patients are accepted.  “Sick” certificates from traditional medical 
practitioners are not as yet accepted in the public service.  Although the traditional 
Medical Practitioner’s Bill has been signed into law, the traditional medical 
practitioner’s statutory council is still not operational in terms of registering traditional 
practitioners, developing training and practising guidelines. 
 
3.3.4  COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS34 
 
Section 213 of the LRA defines a collective agreement in the following terms: 
 
“A written agreement concerning terms and conditions of employment or any other 
matter of mutual interest concluded by one or more registered trade unions, on the 
one hand and, on the other hand 
 
(a) One or more employers 
(b) One or more registered employers’ organization or 
(c) One or more employers and one or more registered employers’ organization.” 
 
Various facets of this definition require comment.35  Firstly, a collective agreement 
need not be signed by the parties to the agreement to be valid.  All that is required is 
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that the agreement must be in writing.  Of course, it would be advisable for the 
parties to a collective agreement to sign a single written document containing the 
agreement as this would assist in eliminating later disputes as to whether or not an 
agreement was actually entered into and what the content of the agreement was, but 
this is not a legal requirement.  Secondly, only registered unions can be parties to a 
collective agreement as defined in the LRA.  This means that only collective 
agreements with unions as parties are regulated by the LRA.  The fact that a union is 
unregistered does not, however, mean that the union cannot conclude a collective 
agreement with an employer.  It simply means that the collective agreement will fall 
outside the scope of the LRA and will not be enforceable in terms of the LRA.  
Thirdly, the definition of the collective agreement also deals with terms and 
conditions of employment or any other matter of mutual interest between the parties.  
Terms and conditions of employment relate to those substantive provisions of the 
employment relationship, such as working hours, remuneration and leave measures. 
 
In view of the above, in the public-education sector there are bargaining councils36 
that negotiate collective agreements that regulate terms and conditions of 
employment including leave of absence in the workplace.  As indicated elsewhere, 
PSCBC Resolution 7 of 2000 and ELRC Collective Agreement 7 of 2001 will be in 
focus. 
 
PSCBC Resolution 7 of 2000 provides that an employee whose normal sick-leave 
credits in a cycle have been exhausted and who, according to the relevant 
practitioner, requires to be absent from work due to disability which is not permanent, 
may be granted sick leave on full pay provided that: 
 
(i) Her or his supervisor is informed that the employee is ill, and  
 
(ii) a relevant registered medical and or dental practitioner has duly certified 
such a condition in advance as temporary disability except where conditions 
do not allow. 
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36  Public Service Co-ordinating Bargaining Council, General Public Service Co-ordinating 
Bargaining Council and Education Labour Relations Council.  
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In the circumstances, the employer shall during 30 working days, investigate the 
extent of inability to perform normal official duties, the degree of inability and the 
cause thereof.  Investigation shall be in accordance with Item 10(1) of Schedule 8 in 
the LRA. 
 
It further states that employees whose degree of disability has been certified as 
permanent shall, with the approval of the employer, be granted a maximum of 30 
working days paid sick leave, or such additional number of days required by the 
employer to finalize the process set out below.  The employer shall, within 30 working 
days, ascertain the feasibility of: 
 
(i) alternative employment; or 
(ii) adapting duties or work circumstances to accommodate the disability. 
 
In the circumstances, if the employer and employee are convinced that the employee 
will never be able to perform any type of duties at her or his level or rank, the 
employee shall proceed with application for ill-health benefits in terms of the Pension 
Law of 1996. 
 
It should be mentioned that ELRC Collective Agreement 7 of 2001 endorses the 
provisions of Chapter J of Personnel Administration Measures to the Employment of 
Education Act as set out above visa versa, read together with PSCBC Resolution 7 
of 2000.  Under the circumstances, it is not in the interest of this study to repeat 
same. 
 
3.4 LEGAL COMPLIANCE IN APPLICATIONS FOR TEMPORARY 
INCAPACITY LEAVE AND ILL-HEALTH-RETIREMENT IN THE PUBLIC-
EDUCATION SECTOR 
 
As indicated earlier, a serious challenge faced by the Eastern Cape Department of 
Basic Education is a high volume of employees, particularly educators, taking long 
and unending sick leave.  Consequently, the Department has been flooded with a 
number of disputes relating to Temporary Incapacity Leave and Ill-Health Retirement. 
 
25 
The procedure to be followed by the employer when faced with incapacity of an 
educator due to ill-health or injury is set out in Schedule 1 of the Employment of 
Educators Act.  Item 3 of the Schedule 1 of the Act imposes a duty on the employer 
to conduct an investigation concerning the extent of the ill-health or injury that may 
have been suffered by the educator.  The conditions that trigger the investigation are 
the following: 
 
 Poor performance arising from ill-health or injury 
 The employer forming the view that that the educator is unable to perform his 
or her duties due to ill-health or injury 
 An application by the educator indicating that he or she requires to be 
discharged from service due to continuous ill-health or injury. 
 
In the circumstances the educator acquires the right to be heard on all aspects 
related to the investigation upon the employer taking the decision to conduct an 
investigation pertaining to incapacity due to ill-health.  Apart of the investigation, the 
employer has, at the State’s expense, to examine the affected educator’s state of 
health.  The educator has a right to nominate any other medical practitioner to be 
involved in his or her ill-health. 
 
In Holdin v Department of Education37 the applicant sought to enforce what she 
referred to as, her constitutional rights which had been infringed by the respondents 
because of the failure to discharge certain statutory duties set out in terms of section 
3 of Schedule 1 of the Employment of Educators Act.  The claim arose from the 
contention of the applicant that the respondents ought to have taken steps to 
investigate her incapacity because of her health condition.  However, in as far as her 
ill-health was concerned, the applicant was apparently granted temporary incapacity 
leave, and on the expiry date the applicant was required by the respondents to obtain 
a second medical opinion regarding her condition.  In this respect, the respondent 
had required the applicant who stayed in Port Elizabeth to attend medical 
assessment by one Dr Erlacher who was based in Grahamstown.  The applicant had 
refused to undergo the second medical assessment citing various reasons. 
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It would appear from the reading of Schedule 1 of the Act that failure or refusal by an 
educator to be subjected to medical examination at the State’s expense constitutes a 
misconduct for which the educator may be disciplined.  If the employer decides to 
discipline an employee for refusing to undertake medical examination the general 
principles governing the substantive and procedural fairness of dealing with a 
disciplinary hearing would apply.  
 
The respondents contended that the applicant sought an order against herself 
because the consequences of the order, if granted, were that she would have to be 
dismissed.  In other words this presupposes that the investigation would lead to an 
automatic dismissal.  The respondents further submitted that an individual could not 
obtain an order against himself or herself. In this respect the respondent relied on the 
court judgment on Thusi v Minister of Home Affairs and 71 Cases,38 where it was 
amongst other things held that “to sue oneself is an oddity.  To ask for and obtain 
relief against oneself is unprecedented …”. 
 
The court in the present case held that there was no reason why failure by the 
employer to conduct an investigation as to the extent of the ill-health or injury could 
not find a cause of action.  The court went further to state that Schedule 1 to the 
Employment of Educators Act provided a procedural right to educators faced with 
incapacity to perform their duties due to ill-health or injury.  The fact that the ultimate 
outcome of the investigation might be a dismissal did not detract from the duty of the 
employer to conduct an investigation, nor take away the right to require the employer 
to conduct, an investigation envisaged in terms of section 3 of Schedule 1 of the 
Employment of Educators Act.  It had to be noted that the fact that the investigation 
might confirm the incapacity due to ill-health did not mean that dismissal was an 
automatic outcome.  Even in a case where the investigation confirms the ill-health or 
injury as being permanent, dismissal is not automatic.  In that instance, the employer 
has the duty in terms of section 3(6) to investigate securing alternative employment 
which may include amongst others a transfer which seemed to be one of the desires 
of the applicant in that case. 
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In the present stance, the applicant sought an order compelling the respondents to 
conduct an investigation in terms of Item 3(1) of the Employment of Educators Act. In 
other words, the applicant sought a mandatory interdict or mandamus.  It is trite that 
in order to succeed in an application of that nature, the applicant has to establish a 
clear right, an injury actually committed or reasonably apprehended as well as the 
absence of similar protection by any other ordinary remedy.  The court relied on the 
judgment in Alliance Cash and Carry (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner of South African 
Revenue Services.  It was the court’s view that the applicant in that case had failed to 
satisfy the requirements for a mandatory interdict.  The respondents had in fact put 
the process in motion by appointing a doctor to conduct the investigation.  It was the 
applicant who refused to cooperate by demanding that the state doctor should be 
based in Port Elizabeth.  The law is clear: the prerogative of choosing a state doctor 
rests with the respondents and does not have to decide that in consultation with the 
applicant.  Thus the remedy of the applicant lay in her cooperation with the 
investigation by attending at Dr Erlacher’s surgery in Grahamstown.  The applicant 
had no right to preempt the findings of Dr Erlacher. 
 
The remaining issue for determination concerned the complaint in regard to the 
deductions from the applicant’s salary.  The court held that that issue related to the 
agreement which was concluded between the parties regarding the application for 
temporary incapacity leave.  The temporary incapacity leave was conditional to the 
outcome of the investigation into the ill-health-related incapacity of the applicant.  It 
was agreed between the parties that, should the application for the temporary 
incapacity leave fail, the respondents had two options of either converting thirty days’ 
leave taken by the applicant or annual leave or unpaid leave.  The application for the 
temporary incapacity leave having been unsuccessful, the respondents converted the 
leave to unpaid leave.  In addition, the deduction was in the court’s view also in line 
with the provisions of section 38 of the Public Service Act39 which entitled an 
employer in the public service to deduct any amount paid to an employee for which 
that employee was not entitled.  In the circumstances, the application for both 
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instances, namely the claims for mandamus and compensation for deductions 
effected by the respondent, was dismissed. 
 
In another matter in Jijana v Eastern Cape Department of Education,40 the applicant  
sought a mandatory interdict in terms of which the Department would be compelled 
to discharge its statutory duties provided for in section 3 of Schedule 1 of the 
Employment of Educators Act.  More in particular, the applicant sought an order 
directing the respondents to take all such steps as may be appropriate to conduct an 
investigation into her ill-health.  The applicant had been unable to report for duty on 
account of ill-health since 2007 due to post-natal depression and generalized anxiety 
disorder.  As a result of her condition her ability to concentrate became impaired.  
The applicant exhausted her sick leave and was obliged to apply for temporary 
incapacity leave in terms of the Policy for Incapacity Leave and Ill-health Retirement.  
The applicant was diagnosed by a psychiatrist as suffering from major depression 
and generalized anxiety disorder and was booked off.  
 
At this juncture, it must be pointed out that, although the applicant complained at 
length in the papers about the refusal by the Department to grant her temporary 
incapacity leave for the said period, the application, held the court, dealt with a 
different matter, namely, her insistence that the Department be compelled to 
investigate the extent of her incapacity.  The court noted that it appeared to be two 
processes relevant in respect of educator incapacity.  One process relates to 
applications in respect of temporary incapacity leave.  The other, which is completely 
different process, relates to the procedure provided in section 3 of Schedule 1 of the 
Employment of Educators Act, which provides for a procedure which may result in 
the discharge of an educator from service as a result of poor health or injury.  As it 
will be pointed out herein below, the latter process may be initiated by either the 
employer or the educator. 
 
The respondents contended that with regards to section 3 of Schedule 1 of the Act, 
the Health-Risk Manager was rendering that service on behalf of the Department.  
The applicant argued that the Department had an obligation to discharge its statutory 
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duties in terms of paragraph 3 of Schedule 1 of the Act. In terms of this paragraph, 
the Department must conduct an investigation which involves a specific process, 
including holding a hearing wherein evidence is adduced and ultimately a written 
report is produced.  The purpose of Schedule 1 is to establish the permanence or 
otherwise of the applicant’s incapacity.  More in particular, the applicant took issue 
with the response from the Department which categorized the referral to the Health-
Risk Manager as compliance with section 3 of Schedule 1.  The applicant submitted 
that the Department had no authority to subordinate its authority and delegate its 
duties to the Health-Risk Manager which was a different one.  The applicant further 
submitted that the procedure envisaged in section 3 of Schedule 1 was a formal 
routine which the Department had not followed. 
 
The court noted that more relevant to the application was the argument that the 
Department had a discretion, which had to be exercised judicially and reasonably, to 
consider whether the applicant had been performing in accordance with her post 
requirements of an educator.  Once such assessment had been made the 
Department had a statutory duty to initiate an appropriate investigation.  In other 
words, according to the applicant, the Department had a statutory duty to investigate 
her ill-health despite the fact that she herself had decided not to apply to be 
discharged from duty on account of her ill-health.  Consequently, the applicant 
submitted that she had met the requirements on the granting of interdict relief in 
that – 
 
 she had a clear right which arose by operation of law in view of statutory duty 
that rested on the respondents; 
 she had no alternative remedy in that the second respondent had failed to 
initiate the investigation and thereby necessitating the present application; 
 she would suffer irreparable harm if the court did not grant the interdict 
compelling the investigation envisaged in section 3 of Schedule 1. 
 
The court noted that section 3(1) envisages two scenarios: 
 
(i) The first scenario was where the employee did not apply for incapacity leave 
but the employer was of the view that the educator was not performing in 
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accordance with the post requirements as a result of poor health or injury.  In 
these circumstances, the employer took the decision to investigate the 
perceived incapacity of the employee. 
 
(ii) The second scenario was where the employee himself or herself decided that 
he or she was not capable to perform her or his duties in accordance with 
post requirements and accordingly applied for a discharge from service on 
account of her or his ill-health or injury.  Where the educator decided to apply 
for a discharge, the employer had to likewise investigate the extent of the ill-
health or injury.  
 
The court held that, the fact that section 3 of Schedule 1 of the Act provided that the 
employer could initiate the process and investigate the ill-health of the educator did 
not mean nor did it give a right to an employee to compel the Department to 
investigate his or her incapacity.  In this regard the respondents submitted that there 
was no authority in labour law or in common law to support a proposition that a 
litigant might obtain relief against him or herself, or which supported the proposition 
that a litigant might obtain relief from the court to order the employer to take steps 
that might lead to the termination of an employee’s services on the basis of 
incapacity.  The court declared that it was not persuaded by the respondent’s 
submission that that was the reason why an employee could not compel the 
Department to investigate.  The reason why the employee could compel the 
Department to investigate was simply because the Employment of Educators Act 
granted the Department discretion to investigate the ill-health of an employee.  
Moreover, an educator had a choice whether to or not to apply to be discharged on 
the basis of ill-health.  It was only the case of he or she had submitted such an 
application, that the Department would be obliged to investigate the extent of the 
incapacity by following the procedures as set out in section 3. 
 
The court held that section 3(1) of the Act did no more than place an overarching 
obligation on the Department to investigate the capacity of an employee in 
circumstances where it was of the view that the educator had not been performing in 
accordance with post requirement that the educator was employed to perform as 
result of poor health or injury or in circumstances where the educator applied to be 
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discharged on the basis of ill-health.  This section does not grant the individual 
employee a right to be investigated by his or her employer.  This right to be 
investigated in terms of the procedure as read in section 3, only arose once the 
employer decided to invoke section 3 or once the educator had applied to be 
discharged.  Put differently, once the employer decided to investigate the employee’s 
ill-health, the employee had the right to insist that such investigation be done in 
accordance with procedures as set out in that section.  In that regard an analogy 
might be drawn with disciplinary hearings.  An employee cannot insist that an 
employer charge him or her and insist that he/she appears before a disciplinary 
hearing.  However, once the employee has been charged, the employee can insist 
that the employer adhere to a fair procedure. 
 
On a proper interpretation of section 3(1) of Schedule 1 of the Employment of 
Educators Act, held the court, an employee was therefore not afforded the cause of 
action relied on by the applicant.  Consequently, the application was dismissed.   
 
3.5 CONCLUSION 
 
Item 3(1) contains two conditions whereby the duty of the employer is to investigate 
the extent of the ill-health or injury.  If the employer decides that an educator is not 
performing in accordance with the post requirements which the educator is expected 
to perform, as result of poor health or injury, the employer must investigate the extent 
of the ill-health or injury. 
 
The second condition is that, if the educator applies for a discharge from service on 
account of continuous ill-health or injury, the employer must investigate the extent of 
the ill-health or injury.  Item 3(1) is not a model of clarity, as the second condition 
contains a degree of permanence in relation to the ill-health, namely in regard to 
applications for discharge from service on account of ill-health. 
 
In circumstances where the first condition does not require such a degree of 
permanence, and merely states that, if the employer is of the view that an educator is 
not performing in accordance with the post requirements for which the educator has 
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been employed to perform, as the result of ill-health or injury, the extent of ill-health 
or injury has to be investigated.  
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CHAPTER 4 
THE PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE REQUIREMENTS ON THE 
TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT DUE TO ILL-HEALTH 
 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The Labour Relations Act41 protects employees against unfair dismissals.  In terms of 
section 186(1)(a), dismissal means that an employer terminated a contract of 
employment with or without notice.  In order to fall within the ambit of this provision 
and to benefit from the protection afforded by the LRA, an employee must prove that 
an overt act on the part of the employer has resulted in the termination of the 
employment contract.  The onus then shifts to the employer to prove that the 
dismissal is both substantively and procedurally fair, failing which the employee will 
be entitled to the remedies afforded by section 193 of the LRA. 
 
In this Chapter focus will be on section 1, read with section 3 of the LRA which 
requires compliance with Articles 7 and 8 of the International Labour Organization 
(hereafter referred to as “ILO”) Convention 158 of 1982, when the employment of a 
worker has been terminated by his or her employer.  Section 34 of the Constitution 
emphasizes this compliance with the procedural provision contained in that section 
as well as the procedural requirements of the rule of law and also procedural 
requirements of Convention 158.  This Chapter will thus examine whether the 
termination of the employment contract due to ill-health is in compliance with section 
188 of the LRA, which decrees that a dismissal is unfair if the employer fails to prove 
that the reason for dismissal is a fair reason related to the employee’s conduct or 
capacity and that the dismissal was effected in accordance with a fair procedure. 
 
                                                          
41  66 of 1995. 
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4.2 COMPLIANCE STANDARDS OF THE LRA 
 
Chapter 1 of the LRA provides: 
 
“The purpose of this Act is to advance economic development, social justice, labour 
peace and the democratization of the workplace by fulfilling the primary objects of 
the Act, which are – 
 
(a) to give effect to and regulate the fundamental rights conferred by section 27 of 
the Constitution;42 
(b) to give effect to obligations incurred by the Republic as a member state of the 
International Labour Organization; 
(c) to provide a framework within which employees and trade unions, and 
employers’ can … 
 
Section 3 of the Act provides that any person applying this Act must interpret its 
provisions – 
 
(a) to give effect to the primary objects 
(b) in compliance with the Constitution; and 
(c) in compliance with the public international law organization of the republic.” 
 
From the above it can be deduced that section 1 and 3 of the LRA require 
compliance with the International Labour Organization Conventions when applying 
and interpreting the Act. ILO has adopted a series of Conventions and 
Recommendations which form the basis of the principles governing the right to fair 
labour practices. 
 
4.3 BACKGROUND ON INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANISATION 
 
The ILO is the international organization responsible for drawing up and overseeing 
international labour standards.  It is the “tripartite” United Nations agency only that 
brings together representatives of governments, employers and workers in order to 
jointly shape policies and programmes promoting decent work for all.  This unique 
                                                          
42  S 27, which is in the chapter of Fundamental rights in the Constitution entrenches the following 
rights: 
(1) Every person shall have the right to fair labour practices. 
(2) Workers shall have the right to form and join trade union, and employers shall have the 
rights to form and join employers’ organisation. 
(3) Workers and employers shall have the right to organise and bargain collectively. 
(4) Workers shall have the right to strike for the purpose of collective bargaining. 
(5) Employers’ recourse to the lock-out for the purpose of collective bargaining shall not be 
impaired, subject to section 33(1). 
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arrangement gives the ILO an edge in incorporating the world knowledge about 
employment and work.  The unique tripartite structure of the ILO gives an equal voice 
to workers, employers and governments to ensure that the views of the social 
partners are closely reflected in labour standards and in shaping policies and 
programmes.  The aims of the ILO are to promote the rights at work, encourage 
decent employment opportunities, enhance social protection and strengthen dialogue 
on work-related issues. 
 
4.4  ILO STANDARDS ON TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT 
 
The most important function of the ILO has been its standards-setting role.  The 
International Labour Conference of the ILO has adopted some 185 Conventions and 
195 Recommendations giving effect to a wide variety of fundamental employments’ 
rights, including freedom of association, elimination of discrimination, social security, 
prohibition of forced labour and the protection of young persons and children.43  It 
should be mentioned that a convention creates international obligation on member 
states that ratify it, but is only binding in that member state if it forms part of 
international customary law, or if the member state has promulgated legislation to 
bring the relevant instrument into effect by incorporating it into national law.  The 
Republic of South Africa is a member of the International Labour Organization and 
has ratified a number of its conventions.  Noting the existing international standards 
contained in the Termination of Employment Recommendation,44 significant 
developments have occurred in the law and practice of many member states on the 
questions covered by that recommendation.  Considering that these developments 
have made it appropriate to adopt new international standards on the subject, 
particularly having regard to serious problems in this field resulting from economic 
difficulties and technological changes experienced in recent years in many countries, 
the General Conference of the ILO adopted the Termination of Employment 
Convention.45 
 
                                                          
43  Du Toit, Bosch, Woolfrey, Cooper, Giles, Bosch and Rossouw Labour Relations Law (2008) 67. 
44  The General Conference of the International Labour Organisation, 1963. 
45  C158,1982. 
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4.4.1  TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT CONVENTION 
 
According to the Termination of Employment Convention the employment contract of 
a worker shall not be terminated unless there is a valid reason for such termination 
connected with the capacity or conduct of the worker, or based on the operational 
requirements of the undertaking, establishment or service.46  Temporary absence 
from work because of illness or injury shall not constitute a valid reason for 
termination.47  
 
Article 7 of the Convention provides that the employment of a worker shall not be 
terminated for reasons related to the worker’s conduct or incapacity before he is 
provided an opportunity to defend himself/herself against the allegations made, 
unless the employer cannot reasonably be expected to provide that opportunity. 
 
Article 8 of the Convention provides that a worker who considers that his employment 
has been unjustifiably terminated shall be entitled to appeal against that termination 
to an impartial body, such as a court, labour tribunal, arbitration committee or 
arbitrator.  A worker may be deemed to have waived his/her rights to appeal against 
the termination of his/her employment if he/she has not exercised that right within a 
reasonable period of time after termination. 
 
4.5  SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS ON TERMINATION OF 
EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT DUE TO ILL HEALTH. 
 
According to Grogan,48 to be fair, a dismissal for incapacity must not only be justified, 
the employer must also follow a fair procedure before taking the decision to dismiss 
the employee.  Procedural fairness is the yardstick by which the employer’s pre-
dismissal actions are measured.  Two requirements of fairness are generally 
regarded as distinct: a substantive fair dismissal may be unfair because the employer 
has failed to follow a fair procedure.  The LRA confirms that procedural and 
substantive fairness are independent requirements for a fair dismissal.49  However, 
                                                          
46  Art 4, C158,1982. 
47  Art 6, C 158, 1982. 
48  Dismissal 230- 232. 
49  S 188. 
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the courts appreciate that it is not possible in all cases to draw a rigid line between 
the requirements of procedural and substantive fairness. 
 
Item 10 of the Code of Good Practice addresses the issue of substantive and 
procedural fairness where dismissal is based on the employee’s incapacity due to 
illness or injury.  Item 11 sets out the statutory guidelines for a dismissal arising from 
ill-health and injury as follows: 
 
“Any person determining whether a dismissal arising from ill -health or injury is unfair 
should consider – 
 
(a) whether or not the employee is capable of performing the work; and 
(b) if the employee is not capable 
(i) the extent to which the employee is able to perform the work 
(ii) the extent to which the employee’s work circumstances might be 
adapted to accommodate disability, or where this is not possible, the 
extent to which the employee’s duties might be adapted 
(iii) the availability of any suitable alternative work.” 
 
In the context of ill-health or injury the employer is required to assess whether or not 
the employee can do the work and if not, the extent to which the employee can 
perform the work, with or without reasonable accommodation, adaptation to the 
employee’s work circumstances or the availability of suitable alternative work for the 
employee.  Some assessment of the nature of the incapacity must be done as well 
as the degree and permanency of the injury or ill-health.  These assessments must 
be done in order to determine whether a dismissal would be appropriate in the 
circumstances.  Once again the dismissal must be both substantively and 
procedurally fair.50  Both aspects of substantive and procedural fairness are 
illustrated in Item 10(1) of the LRA as follows – 
 
(1) Incapacity on the grounds of ill-health or injury may be temporary or 
permanent.  If an employee is temporarily unable to work in these 
circumstances, the employer should investigate the extent of the incapacity 
or the injury.  If the employee is likely to be absent for a period that is 
unreasonably long in the circumstances, the employer should investigate all 
the possible alternatives short of dismissal.  When alternatives are 
                                                          
50  Basson et al Essential Labour Law 144-145. 
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considered, relevant factors might include the nature of the job, the period of 
absence, the seriousness of the illness or injury and the possibility of 
securing a temporary replacement for the ill or injured employee. In cases of 
permanent incapacity, the employer should ascertain the possibility of 
securing alternative employment, or adapting the duties or work 
circumstances of the employee to accommodate the employee’s disability. 
 
(2) In the process of the investigation referred to in subsection (1) the employee 
should be allowed the opportunity to state a case in response and to be 
assisted by a trade union representative or fellow employee. 
 
(3) The degree of incapacity is relevant to the fairness of any dismissal.  The 
cause of the incapacity may also be relevant. In the case of certain kinds of 
incapacity, for example alcoholism or drug abuse, counseling and 
rehabilitation may be appropriate steps for an employee to consider. 
 
(4) Particular consideration should be given to employees who are injured at 
work or who are incapacitated by work-related illness.  The courts have 
indicated that the duty on the employer to accommodate the incapacity of the 
employee is more onerous in the circumstances. 
 
According to Basson et al Item 10(1) highlights the nature, degree and extent of the 
incapacity, and the steps the employer should take to accommodate the employee.  
The incapacity must arise from either ill-health or injury, and any physical or mental 
incapacity may therefore be considered.  The Code makes particular mention of 
“work-related” injury or illness, suggesting that there is a more onerous duty on 
employers to accommodate the incapacity of the employee in such circumstances.  It 
is said that not only physical ill-health or injury is relevant, but the mental illness or 
stress may also result in an employee’s incapacity for a period of time.  Whether 
incapacity is temporary or permanent is also an important consideration.  If incapacity 
is permanent, other considerations are also relevant.  The possibility of finding 
alternative employment within the organization for the employee should be 
considered as should the possibility of adapting the duties or work circumstances of 
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the employee to accommodate the disability or incapacity.  A related issue is that of 
habitual absenteeism, where an employee is often absent from work due to ill-health 
or injury.  The courts have considered this issue in a number of cases, and it appears 
that the approach of the court will vary according to the degree and nature of the 
absenteeism.51  It is said that the employee’s frequent and lengthy absences may 
justify termination at a point where the employer can no longer be expected to 
tolerate such absences.  However, the employee is still entitled to be adequately 
consulted and for a fair procedure to be followed.52 
 
In NUMSA obo Hewu v Robert SA (Pty) Ltd,53 after being repeatedly counseled for 
absenteeism, the applicant was dismissed in terms of the respondent’s disciplinary 
policy.  The applicant claimed that he was HIV positive and that his absence at work 
had been linked to that chronic condition.  The arbitrator noted that it was clear from 
the evidence that the applicant had been dismissed for incapacity, not for 
misconduct.  The issue was accordingly, whether the respondent had complied with 
the guidelines set by the Code of Good Practice: Dismissal for incapacity. It was also 
noted that the performance standard set by the respondent’s incapacity policy was 
reasonable and had been agreed to by the union.  The applicant had been absent 
from work for more than 50 days in two years.  Furthermore the applicant had been 
afforded ample opportunity to meet the required performance standard.  However, 
the evidence also indicated that the managers who conducted the incapacity hearing 
were unaware the applicant was suffering from a chronic condition, and treated his 
absences rather as a form of misconduct.  It was held that the respondent’s policy 
provided that absences due to chronic conditions should not be held against 
employees.  That rendered the dismissal both procedurally and substantive unfair.  
The applicant was reinstated with retrospective effect. 
 
In another case, Mambalu v AECI Explosives Ltd (Zommerveld),54 which was heard 
in the Industrial Council under the Labour Relations Act of 1956.55  The applicant’s 
absence amounted to 47 days in a period of two years.  It was also shown the 
                                                          
51  Basson et al Essential Labour Law 147. 
52  See Henn v Eskom [1996] 6 BLLR 747 (IC). 
53  ARB MEPE 571 unreported.  
54  (1995) 16 ILJ 960 (IC). 
55  28 of 1956. 
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applicant had a habit of absenting himself or being ill shortly before or after 
weekends.  The applicant had a contractual entitlement of 15 days’ sick leave per 
annum.  Any absence due to illness was treated on an unpaid basis once the 
entitlement was depleted; however, the submission of a medical certificate was still 
required.  The applicant provided authentic doctors’ notes in all instances of ill-health 
absence.  The employer contended that the applicant was dismissed due to a rule 
relating to ill-health absenteeism that amounts to poor work performance.  The 
evidence led by the respondent was that it believed that the applicant was not being 
completely honest in respect of his health absences, especially with respect to the 
extension of weekends.  This pattern seemed to suggest abuse, which greatly 
differed from the charge of poor timekeeping.  The applicant was dismissed as result 
of persistent absence.  The issue in dispute was whether the absence was regarded 
as legitimate and, if it were, whether such absence could lead to dismissal.  The 
applicant never disputed the fact that he absented himself for 47 days or that most of 
his absences were near or towards weekends.  His contention was that he was 
genuinely ill and that this was supported by his medical certificates, of which the 
authenticity was not challenged by management.  The applicant contended that his 
ill-health was caused by his working conditions.  The court held that the applicant 
was dismissed for misconduct due to dishonesty regarding sick absences and that 
this amounted to abuse of sick leave.  It further contended that in order to establish 
abuse, evidence of dishonesty must be provided.  Based on this contention the court 
had to decide whether there was a valid reason dismissal as the company had 
conceded to the correctness of the medical certificates.  The court accepted that the 
applicant was genuinely ill on each of the occasions that he was absent due to ill-
health and the provision of medical certificates proved.  Therefore, the court found 
that there was not a valid reason for the dismissal and that it was unfair. 
 
The matter was referred to the Labour Appeal Court56 and the facts of the case were 
reiterated.  The court held that that case was a good example of the problem of 
absenteeism and how courts often needed to distinguish between the three different 
types of dismissals- misconduct, incapacity and operational requirements.  In that 
case, the Labour Appeal Court held that the employer had in fact given the employee 
                                                          
56  AECI Explosives Ltd (Zomerveld) v Mambalu (1995) 16 ILJ 1505 (LAC). 
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warnings to improve and an opportunity to state a case in response.  The employee 
did not improve and on appeal it was held, that a fair procedure for incapacity due to 
habitual absenteeism had been followed.  In a dismissal for incapacity the 
requirement of procedural fairness was not always independent of the substantive 
fairness requirement.  The process to establish substantive fairness had to, however, 
be procedurally fair.  The Code sets out the guidelines for procedural fairness for a 
dismissal for ill-health or injury in Item 10(2).  The process focuses on an 
investigation of the illness or injury, consultation with the employee, and giving the 
employee an opportunity to state a case why he or she should not be dismissed.  
There has been some debate as to whether the process entails a formal hearing.  It 
seems that if the employee is given a fair opportunity to indicate why he or she 
should not be dismissed the essential feature of procedural fairness has been 
complied with, provided of course, that the employee has received counseling and or 
consultation regarding the incapacity and possible accommodation.  
 
4.5.1 INCAPACITY OR DISABILITY  
 
In some circumstances it may be necessary to distinguish disability and incapacity in 
determining the need to accommodate or the fairness of a dismissal. It is becoming 
more difficult to make the distinction between which illness or injuries are considered 
to incapacitate an individual or render him/her disabled.  Disabling illness or injuries 
fall within the scope of the concept of ill-health absenteeism.  If the illness or injury is 
deemed to be a disability, a greater onus is placed on the employer than merely 
fulfilling the requirements of an ill-health incapacity process.  It becomes important to 
make a distinction because special provisions relate to individuals who are rendered 
disabled.  The difference between incapacitated individuals and disabled individuals 
is that in the former the employee is not able to perform the essential functions of the 
job, and in the later the employee is suitably qualified to perform the essential job 
functions with some form of accommodation.  The definition of people with disabilities 
is quite broad in that physical or mental impairment could possibly be a disability.  
From the definition it is clear that a condition will be evaluated in terms of whether it 
is deemed to be substantially limiting.  If a condition can be treated in such a way that 
the impairment can be controlled or corrected and the adverse impacts are prevented 
or removed, then the impairment can no longer be regarded as substantially limiting. 
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In a matter between NEHAWU obo Lucas and the Department of Health, Western 
Cape,57 the arbitrator examined the employment of people with disabilities and the 
extent of the employer’s duty to accommodate.  In this matter the applicant had been 
employed as a general worker in the nursing department of the hospital operated by 
the Department of Health.  After being injured on duty she could no longer be able to 
bend or lift heavy objects and was transferred to the clerical department while she 
was being assessed.  She did not cope well there and the other employees were 
unhappy that her work output was low and that she received special treatment.  After 
an unsuccessful application for a more administrative post her superintendent 
applied for her to be discharged for incapacity in terms of the Public Service Act,58 
but the Department required that she be assessed by a specialist and by an 
occupational therapists.  The applicant was then revised by her union and she 
refused to be seen by the occupational therapist.  Subsequent thereto her 
employment was terminated for incapacity due to ill-health or injury.  The 
Department’s Code incorporated the Labour Relations Act Code of Good Practice 
and the employer purported to have complied with the terms of Items 10 and 11 
thereof. 
 
In determining the fairness of dismissal, the arbitrator noted that the Code of Good 
Practice in the Employment Equity Act59 was far expansive than the Labour Relations 
Act Code in respect of impairments that amounted to a disability.  In that, where 
impairment amounted to a disability under the Employment Equity Act, the employee 
was entitled to reasonable accommodation.  The arbitrator adopted a purposive 
approach that the general objective of the statutory arrangements in both the LRA 
and Employment Equity Act was to promote procedural and substantive fairness in 
relation to people with disabilities and to encourage employers to keep people with 
disabilities in employment if there were good reasons for accommodation.  The 
arbitrator was of the view that the general concept of fairness required an employer 
to consider whether a particular employee was a person with disabilities under the 
Employment Equity Act in determining whether there was a sufficient, valid and fair 
                                                          
57  (2004) 25 ILJ 2091 (BCA). 
58  103 of 1994. 
59  55 of 1998. 
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reason to terminate employment.  The arbitrator’s view was that even in 
circumstances where the employee had not specifically sought special treatment with 
reference to the Employment Equity Act, and claimed the status of the person with 
disability the above ought to be taken into consideration.  The arbitrator made a point 
that disability status was not to be considered only as a weapon to claim special 
treatment under the affirmative-action provisions in Chapter 2 of the Act, but that it 
should also be considered as a shield to protect the person who has a disability from 
being dismissed from employment for a reason related to that disability. 
 
Having considered the extent of the employer’s duty to make reasonable 
accommodation for the employee, the arbitrator found insufficient evidence that the 
employer had considered any reasonable accommodation in relation to this rule or 
the nursing department, but all in relation to the clerical job for which she was in any 
event not qualified.  This entailed more than considering alternatives only; the 
employer had to try also and create a suitable role for the ill employee.  What this 
award raises is that compliance with the Labour Relations Act Code may not be 
sufficient in instances where ill-health leads to disability.  The LRA Code requires 
employers to look for suitable alternatives, adapt the employee’s current role where 
possible to accommodate the employee’s circumstances.  With the general notion 
being that, if the employer complied, the termination is viewed as being fair both 
substantively and procedurally.  Under the Employment Equity Act Code, however, 
and in particular Item 11 which is a guideline on retaining people who became 
disabled during employment, employers are required to assess if a disability can be 
reasonably accommodated, and the employer is enjoined to explore the possibility of 
alternative reduced work or flexible work arrangement. 
 
In Standard Bank of South Africa v CCMA60 the employee was dismissed as a result 
of her high absenteeism and low productivity.  The court held that the employee was 
unfairly dismissed based on various reasons cited hereafter.  The bank did not follow 
a proper procedure and this was inextricably connected to the dismissal which made 
it substantively unfair.  The court held that the employee’s condition amounted to 
disability and that the company failed as well to justify the dismissal.  The Labour 
                                                          
60  [2008] 4 BLLR 356 (LC). 
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Court examined the duty of the employer to consult with employee and where 
necessary to make reasonable accommodation for her after a motor-vehicle accident 
while on duty that left her with severe back pain.  The employer had accepted that 
the employee had a long-term physical impairment but failed to accommodate her by 
making adequate adjustments to her workstation.  The bank had therefore failed to 
comply with Items 10 and 11 of Schedule 8 of the LRA and with the Code of Good 
Practice61 as well as with the bank guidelines.  The court held that in such a case the 
onus was on the employer to demonstrate that it had made every reasonable effort to 
accommodate the employee or that reasonable accommodation was unjustified. 
 
4.6 CONCLUSION 
 
As it has already been indicated, incapacity is one of the internationally recognized 
grounds for a fair dismissal.  Section 188 of the LRA equally recognizes that 
incapacity may be a valid reason for dismissal, provided that the employer can prove 
that the dismissal was for a fair reason and that a fair pre-dismissal procedure was 
followed.  Section 188 of the LRA refers to incapacity but it does not distinguish 
between poor work performance and ill-health or injury.  The distinction is drawn in 
the Code of Good Practice: Dismissal.  The Code stresses that each case is unique 
and departures from the code may, at times, be justified since the provisions of the 
Code serve merely as guidelines for the parties.  
                                                          
61  On the employment of people with disabilities under the Employment Equity Act, 1998 (Act 55 
of 1998). 
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CHAPTER 5 
COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS AND ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 
 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In Chapter 3 of this study, the candidate has discussed the definition of a collective 
agreement as contemplated within the provisions the LRA.  However, some elements 
of the discussion in the previously mentioned chapter might be mentioned where 
applicable.  This chapter is, among other things, intended to take the issue of 
collective agreement beyond just the definition, and include the binding effect of 
collective agreements, interpretation and application of collective agreements as well 
as dispute resolution procedures.  It is worth mentioning as well that for the purpose 
of this chapter, a subject of discussion is regarding the interpretation and application 
of collective agreements,62 co-signed in the public sector by the organized labour and 
the State as the employer. 
 
This chapter will further examine whether the decision or discretion exercised by the 
Head of Department in granting or declining application for ill-health is administrative 
action or interpretation and application of collective agreement.  This legal question 
will be highlighted with specific reference with case law handed down by our courts. 
 
5.2 THE BINDING EFFECT OF COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS 
 
The legal effect of collective agreements is comprehensively dealt with in section 23 
of the LRA.  Section 23 of the Act provides that: 
 
“(1) A collective agreement binds – 
 
(a) the parties to the collective agreement; 
(b) each party to the collective agreement, in so far as the provisions are 
applicable between them; 
                                                          
62  PSCBC Resolution 7 of 2000 as amended by PSCBC Resolution 5 of 2001, and PSCBC 
Resolution 15 OF 2002.  ELRC Collective Agreement 7 of 2001. 
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(c) the members of a registered trade union and employers who are 
members of a registered employers’ organisation that are party to the 
collective agreement if the collective agreement regulates – 
 
(i) terms and conditions of employment; or 
(ii) the conduct of the employers in relation to their employees or the 
conduct of the employees in relation to their employers, 
 
(d) employees who are not members of the registered trade union or trade 
unions party to the agreement if – 
 
(i) the employees are identified in the agreement; 
(ii) the trade union or those trade unions have their members the 
majority of employees employed by the employer in the workplace. 
 
(2) A collective agreement binds for the whole period of the collective agreement 
every person bound in terms of subsection (1)(c) who was a member at the 
time it became binding, or who becomes a member after it became binding, 
whether or not that person continues to be a member of the registered trade 
union or registered employers’ organization for the duration of the collective 
agreement. 
 
(3) Where applicable, a collective agreement varies any contract of employment 
between an employee and the employer who are both bound by the collective 
agreement. 
 
(4) Unless the collective agreement provides otherwise, any party to a collective 
agreement that is concluded for an indefinite period may terminate the 
agreement by giving reasonable notice in writing to other parties.” 
 
Section 23(3) of the Act resolves the relationship between the collective agreements 
and individual contracts of service.63  It provides that “(w)here applicable a collective 
agreement varies any contract of employment between an employee and an 
employer who are both bound by the collective agreement”.  Grogan further argues 
that this provision does not mean that in workplaces or sectors governed by 
collective agreements, individual employments contracts cease to have relevance.  
To effect a contract of employment in any way, the employee concerned must have 
been a member of one of the parties to the collective agreement, or the agreement 
must have been extended to him or her under section 23(1)(d) of the Act. 
 
Since collective agreements supersede contracts of employment, employers and 
employees may not conclude contracts of employment that purport to waive the 
provisions of collective agreements by which they would otherwise be bound. 
 
                                                          
63  Grogan Collective Labour Law (2010) 128. 
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5.3  DISPUTES ABOUT COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS 
 
Section 24 of the LRA states that every collective agreement (excluding closed- and 
agency-shop agreements) must contain a procedure for the resolution of disputes 
about the interpretation or the interpretation of collective agreements.  The LRA 
provides that such a procedure must first require the parties to attempt to resolve the 
dispute through conciliation and, if that fails, to have the dispute resolved by means 
of arbitration. 
 
According to the LRA,64 if the collective agreement does not contain a dispute-
resolution procedure, or if the procedure is not operative, the dispute may be referred 
to the CCMA.  A dispute about the interpretation or application of a collective 
agreement may also be referred to the CCMA if one of the parties has frustrated the 
dispute-resolution procedure contained in the collective agreement.  Because a 
dispute about the interpretation and application of a collective agreement must finally 
be resolved through arbitration, such a dispute may not be the subject of a strike or 
lock-out. 
 
5.4  INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS 
 
The Department of Education has been inundated with disputes concerning the 
interpretation and application of collective agreements65 relating to applications for 
incapacity leave and ill-health retirement. 
 
As already indicated elsewhere, the critical question raised in some of the disputes is 
whether the decision or a discretion exercised by the Head of Department in granting 
or declining applications for ill-health, administrative action or interpretation and 
application of collective agreement.  It should be noted that the Policy and Procedure 
for Incapacity Leave and Ill-Health Retirement in the Public Service is issued under 
Statute, that is section 3(3) of the Public Service Act,66 and therefore it is not a 
                                                          
64  Ss 24(3), (4) and (5). 
65  Supra. 
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collective agreement.  However, PSCBC Resolution 7 of 2000 as amended67 is a 
collective agreement signed in respect of processes and procedures for incapacity 
leave, and ill-health-retirement applications, and is as such subject to the LRA in 
respect of disputes arising from its interpretation and application. 
 
As already noted, every collective agreement is expected to contain provisions for 
resolving such disputes.  Only if a collective agreement contains no such provision, 
or if the procedures provided for are not operative, or if one of the parties is 
frustrating the process, may the dispute be referred to CCMA for conciliation and if 
necessary, arbitration.68  The dividing line between the interpretation and application 
disputes may not always be absolutely clear.  According to Grogan, a dispute over 
the interpretation and application of a collective agreement exists if the parties 
disagree over the meaning of a particular set of facts and circumstances.  Grogan 
further states that both types of disputes may arise in the same case. 
 
Grogan further argues that disputes over the interpretation and or application of 
collective agreements must not be confused with disputes over their validity and 
termination.  The fact is that collective agreements, like any other written 
memorandum of agreement, are meant to reflect the intention of the parties at the 
time they concluded the agreement.  The courts and arbitrators must clearly attempt 
to give effect to that intention when interpreting or applying collective agreements.  
This approach has been applied in a number of cases which will be discussed in 
paragraph that follow. 
 
In Public Servants Association of South Africa obo De Bruyn v Minister of Safety and 
Security,69 the appellant employee, applied for paid temporary incapacity leave after 
being booked off while suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder.  The SAPS 
declined his request on the basis that the employee’s condition had not arisen as a 
result of his work.  The employee was granted unpaid leave instead.  Having referred 
a dispute to the Safety and Security Bargaining Council, the appellant’s union 
approached the Labour Court for an order reviewing and setting aside the decision to 
                                                          
67  PSCBC Resolution 15 of 2002, ELRC Collective Agreement 7 of 2001. 
68  Grogan Collective Labour Law 132. 
69  [2012] 9 BLLR 888 (LAC). 
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refuse the employee temporary incapacity leave on the ground that SAPS had 
unreasonably delayed responding to his request.  After analyzing the evidence 
placed before it and considering the relevant authorities, the Labour Court upheld the 
jurisdictional point and dismissed the application.  The court concluded: 
 
“In the light of the above discussion, in my view, leave, including incapacity and 
temporary incapacity leave at the respondent’s workplace is governed by the 
provisions of Resolution 5 of 2001 of the PSCBC, which is a binding agreement. 
 
The appropriate forum to challenge the decision of the second respondent refusing 
the employee special paid or temporary incapacity leave is not administrative action 
or the exercise of a public power as contemplated in PAJA.  In refusing to grant the 
employee special leave or temporary incapacity leave the (second) respondent was 
exercising a discretion provided for and governed by Resolution 5 of the PSCBC.  It 
is, therefore my view that the cause of action for the applicant rests in the 
application and or interpretation of the provisions of PSCBC, through its dispute 
resolution mechanisms.  Thus the employee’s application stands to be dismissed for 
that reason.” 
 
In an appeal against the judgment and order of the Labour Court, the appellant 
argued that the Labour Court had jurisdiction to hear the dispute by virtue of the 
provisions of section 158(1)(h) of the LRA.  It was further argued that the collective 
agreement did not provide a remedy and that even if it was accepted that it did, it did 
not affect or exclude the jurisdiction of the Labour Court in that the appellant was not 
pursuing the claim in terms of collective agreement but via review based on section 
158(1)(h) of the LRA.  It was further argued that an employee was entitled to fair 
labour practices as set out in section 23 of the Constitution, that the right to fair 
labour practices was enforceable under the provisions of section 158(i)(h), and that 
the claim was not based on the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act.70  It was the 
respondent’s contention that the conclusion by the Labour Court regarding its lack of 
jurisdiction, was correct, having regard to the cause of action and that the grounds of 
review set out in the founding affidavit were premised on the provisions of section 6 
of PAJA.  It was further argued that the decision under consideration was not 
administrative action as envisaged in PAJA; the Labour Court was not clothed with 
necessary jurisdiction to hear review application.  This argument was relied, inter 
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alia, on the decision in Chirwa v Transnet Ltd,71 Gcaba v Minister for Safety & 
Security.72 
 
The Labour Appeal Court noted that section 158(1) (h) empowered the Labour Court 
to review any decision taken or act performed by the State in its capacity as 
employer on any grounds permitted by law.  That provision had to be understood in 
the context in which it was enacted.  At that time, the court held, employment in the 
public service was regulated by the common law, the unfair labour-practice 
jurisdiction of the erstwhile industrial court, other statutes and law of judicial review.  
Section 158(1)(h) of the Act was intended to preserve the latter remedy.  However, 
the supposition that public servants still had more remedies at their disposal than 
employees in the private sector was dispelled by Chirwa v Transnet Ltd,73 in which it 
was held that the dismissal of public servants did not constitute administrative action.  
Dismissals by department of State were merely acts of the State in its capacity as 
employer. 
 
The court further remarked that one situation in which the court would be slow to 
grant relief under section 158(1)(h) was where the LRA provided an alternative 
remedy, such as the requirement that the dispute concerned had to be referred for 
statutory arbitration. 
 
The court held that the employee’s case fell entirely within the provisions of the 
collective agreement governing temporary incapacity leave in the SAPS.  Had the 
court a quo granted the relief sought, it would have had to interpret and apply that 
provision.  Section 24 of the LRA required such disputes to be referred for arbitration.  
Furthermore, the court remarked, the appellant union had committed itself to this 
course when it referred a dispute to the SSSBC.  The decision to change tack and 
approach the Labour Court was ill-conceived and ill-fated, pronounced the court.  
The appeal was dismissed with costs. 
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73  Supra. 
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In another matter in Minister of Safety and Security v Safety and Security Sectoral 
Bargaining Council74 third respondent, (Adri Badenhorst) made an application for a 
transfer from Information and Management System, Management (ISM), Provincial 
Commissioner Office, Zwelitsha to Community Service Centre, Mount Road Police 
Station, Port Elizabeth.  The appellant (Minister of Safety and Security) in the person 
of Commissioner Dlani disapproved the third respondent’s application for transfer on 
the basis of the service-delivery needs of the appellant. 
 
The third respondent lodged a dispute about the interpretation and application of a 
collective agreement, challenging the decision taken by the appellant to disapprove 
the application for transfer.  In short, the third respondent argued that at the 
arbitration proceedings that Commissioner Dlani had failed to apply his mind to the 
factors which were listed in clause 10 of Resolution 5 of 1999 when coming to her 
decision to refuse the transfer.   
 
The dispute between the aforementioned parties was ultimately arbitrated by the 
second respondent (John Cheerie Robertson) under the auspices of the first 
respondent (Safety and Security Sectoral Bargaining Council).  In arbitration award, 
the second respondent found that the decision of the applicant not to approve the 
third respondent’s application for a transfer was capricious, illogical and irrational and 
hence invalid. 
 
Although the arbitrator dealt with the categorization of the dispute (as being the 
interpretation and application of collective agreement) the categorization of the 
dispute was not placed in dispute by either of the parties at the proceedings. 
 
The court a quo corrected the second respondent’s arbitration award only to the 
extent to disapprove the application for a transfer invalid ab initio.  The court a quo 
set that finding aside.  The court a quo, however, effectively dismissed the 
application for review and thereafter made the arbitration award an order of the court. 
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The appellant approached the Labour Appeal Court for an appeal.  The issue before 
the Labour Appeal Court was whether or not the Safety and Security Bargaining 
Council, which was the first respondent in those proceedings, had jurisdiction to deal 
with the dispute that resulted in arbitration award which was the subject of the 
proceedings in the Labour Court.  That issue would be determined by how the court 
answered the further question whether or not the second respondent had correctly 
classified the dispute before him as one concerning the interpretation and application 
of collective agreement.  In that regard the appellant contended that in substance the 
dispute was about the fairness of the third respondent’s transfer, whereas the 
respondents contended that it was a dispute about the interpretation or application of 
a collective agreement.  It was accepted that both parties’ counsel that, if the dispute 
was a dispute about the interpretation or application of a collective agreement, the 
SSSBC had jurisdiction in respect of the dispute and, therefore, the appeal would fall 
to be dismissed, but that, if the dispute was about the fairness of the transfer, the 
SSSBC did not have jurisdiction and appeal would have had to be upheld.  
 
Zondo JP, remarked that he was of the view that a recognition of the distinction 
between a real dispute, on the one hand, and an issue in a dispute on the other, was 
determinative of that matter.  In handing down his judgment, Zondo JP, relied on the 
judgment which was handed down on the same day by that court in the case of 
Johannesburg City Parks v Mpahlani, J NO75 in respect of which the judgment had 
been reserved and had not yet been handed down at that stage.  In that case an 
employee who was aggrieved by his dismissal had referred an unfair-dismissal 
dispute to the Local Government Bargaining Council at a time when a certain 
demarcation dispute had been referred to the Commission for Conciliation, 
Mediation, and Arbitration.  In that case the arbitrator arbitrated the dispute and 
issued an award in favour of the employee.  In a subsequent review application 
brought by the employer, it was contended on behalf of the employer that the Local 
Government Bargaining Council had had no jurisdiction to arbitrate the dispute 
because the dispute was about the interpretation and application of a collective 
agreement containing the dispute-resolution procedure of the bargaining council and 
section 62(3A) of the LRA which was to the effect that proceedings about the 
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interpretation and application of a collective agreement had to be adjourned 
whenever a question arose in such proceedings about a demarcation dispute. 
 
The argument presented on behalf of the employer in that case was that every 
dispute that has been dealt with by a bargaining council in terms of its dispute 
procedure is a dispute about the interpretation and application of a collective 
agreement.  At paragraph 16 of the judgment of that court in Johannesburg City 
Parks matter the following explanation of the difference between a dispute and issue 
in a dispute appears: 
 
“(18)  There are a number of areas in the LRA which contain references to disputes 
or proceedings that are about the interpretation and application of collective 
agreement, particularly in provisions that deal with dispute resolution. Some 
sections of the LRA which contain such references are Sections 22 and 24. In 
all of those sections the references to disputes about interpretation and 
application of collective agreements are references to the main disputes 
sought to be resolved and not issues that need to or may need to be 
answered or dealt with in order to resolve the main dispute. Let me make an 
example to illustrate the distinction I seek to draw between a dispute and an 
issue in dispute. One may have a situation where an employee is dismissed 
for operational requirements and that dismissal is challenged as unfair 
because it is said that in terms of certain collective agreement the employer 
was supposed to follow a certain procedure before dismissing the employee 
but did not follow such procedure. In such a case, in determining whether the 
dismissal was fair or unfair, the Labour Court would have to determine 
whether the relevant provision of the collective agreement were applicable to 
that particular dismissal. The employer may argue that, although the collective 
agreement is binding on the parties, the particular clause did not apply to a 
particular dismissal. This means that the Labour Court has to interpret and 
apply the collective agreement in order to resolve the dispute concerning the 
fairness or otherwise of dismissal for operational requirements. So, the real 
dispute is about the fairness or otherwise of the dismissal and the issue of 
whether certain clauses of the collective agreement are applicable and or 
were complied with before the employee was dismissed is an issue necessary 
to be decided in order to resolve the real dispute. 
 
(19) In the above example it cannot be said, for example, that the Labour Court 
has no jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute concerning the dismissal for 
operational requirements and it must be referred to arbitration just because, 
prior to or in the course of resolving the dismissal dispute, the issue 
concerning the interpretation or application of certain clauses of the collective 
agreement must be decided, it would be different, however, where the main 
dispute as opposed to an issue in dispute, is the interpretation and application 
of collective agreement. In the latter case the Labour Court would ordinarily 
not have jurisdiction in respect of the dispute and the dispute will be required 
to be resolved through arbitration in terms of the LRA. 
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(20) The proposition advanced by Counsel for the appellant made no distinction 
between a dispute, on the one hand, and an issue in dispute, on the other. 
That is why the appellant’s Counsel was driven to submit that all disputes 
which are dealt with by a bargaining council are all dispute about the 
application of a collective agreement because, the procedures for dealing with 
such disputes are provided for in a collective agreement. Obviously, this 
proposition can simply not be correct. In bargaining councils, proceedings are 
held that are about all kinds of disputes such as proceedings about dismissal 
disputes concerning the interpretation and application of collective agreement, 
proceedings concerning disputes about organizational rights, proceedings 
about wage disputes and proceedings concerning other disputes.” 
 
Turning to the present matter, Zondo JP held that he was of the view that, the dispute 
that was before the second respondent in the case of Minister of Safety and Security 
v Safety & Security Sectoral Bargaining Council was a dispute concerning the 
fairness or otherwise of Commissioner Dlani’s refusal to approve the third 
respondent’s application or request for a transfer, as well as the application of the 
provisions of collective agreement was an issue in a dispute.  It was an issue which 
had or might have had to be dealt with in order to resolve the real dispute.  That was 
the main dispute.  The judge remarked that the dispute itself did not relate to an 
application of the collective agreement. 
 
In the light of the above, the judge concluded that the first and second respondents 
held no jurisdiction to arbitrate the dispute in that case because it was a dispute 
concerning the fairness, or otherwise, of Commissioner Dlani’s decision not approve 
the third respondent’s request or application for a transfer, while the first and second 
respondents had no jurisdiction to deal with such a dispute. 
 
Accordingly the court a quo erred in not granting the appellant application for review.  
The appeal was upheld and the order of the Labour Court was set aside.  The review 
application was granted.  The arbitration award issued by the second respondent 
was reviewed and set aside. 
 
In Combrink v SAPS,76 the applicant was diagnosed with post-traumatic-stress 
syndrome and applied to be medically boarded.  After evaluation by the SAPS Health 
Risk Management, he was placed in a “low stress” post.  However, the applicant was 
still unable to cope, and took an extended sick leave.  A further application for early 
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retirement was refused by the SAPS National Commissioner, but the applicant failed 
to report for duty.  He referred a dispute concerning the interpretation and application 
of the applicable provision in the SAPS ill-health-retirement policy, contending that he 
was entitled to be medically boarded and seeking an order to that effect.  The main 
dispute concerned the fairness or otherwise of the National Commissioner’s refusal 
to grant the application for ill-health retirement.  That discretion was exercised in 
terms of a national instruction and regulations issued under the Police Act 7 of 1958, 
neither of which was a collective agreement. 
 
The Commissioner relied on the Labour Appeal Court decision in Minister of Safety 
and Security v SSSBC77 which provided guiding principles in dealing with what 
constitutes the main dispute sought to be resolved and an issue in dispute.  The 
issue in dispute might have needed to be answered or dealt with in order to resolve 
the main dispute.  The main dispute in this case having had regard to the facts and 
circumstances mentioned above was the fairness or otherwise of the decision of the 
National Commissioner or his delegate to decline the application for ill-health 
retirement.  To further illustrate this point, the applicant, whether intentionally or 
fortuitously, in his written argument had argued that the process followed by the 
respondent in considering the applicant’s application was unfair and unjust. 
 
The main issue to be resolved was the granting of ill-health retirement as 
contemplated in the Resolution, whilst the issue in dispute as referred, despite its 
phrasing by the applicant, was clearly regarding the fairness or otherwise the 
decision to decline the application for ill-health retirement.  The Labour Appeal Court 
in Minister of Safety and Security78 had determined that the council would lack 
jurisdiction to arbitrate a dispute where the issue in dispute pertained to the fairness 
or otherwise of a decision taken by the National Commissioner.  To merely hold that 
given the nature of the dispute, the council did not have jurisdiction to arbitrate the 
dispute without indicating what recourse the employee had, in the Commissioner’s 
view created further uncertainty.  This is even more pertinent in cases such as the 
one in casu, where there was an exercise of discretion by a National Commissioner 
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or his delegate to decline applications for ill-health retirement in circumstances 
where, in the Commissioner’s view, no justifiable reasons existed.  
 
The Commissioner held that, although on the face of it the refusal to allow the 
applicant to be medically boarded, seemed unfair, the proper remedy for an 
employee wishing to challenge the exercise by the National Commissioner regarding 
discretion was an application for review by a competent court. 
 
In the premise, it was the Commissioner’s view that the only route available to 
employees in such cases would be to challenge such decisions on the basis of 
administrative-law principles.  The Labour Court and High Court had exclusive 
jurisdiction to deal with such matters.  The Commissioner, however, cautioned that 
not every case should haphazardly be referred to the courts.  
 
5.5 CONCLUSION 
 
From the above it can be deduced that Temporary Incapacity Leave is a privilege 
related to “special sick leave” that may be granted by the relevant employer to public-
service employees in deserving cases only.  It is important for all employees to 
understand that Temporary Incapacity Leave is not a basic condition of employment 
in terms of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act, 1997, as well as furthermore not 
an employee’s right to be granted such leave; in fact, it is granted entirely and solely 
at the discretion of the Head of Department, and is at the very least, conditional upon 
a number of qualifying factors, before approval for such leave shall be granted.  
 
In the circumstances, the decision to decline temporary incapacity leave and ill-health 
retirement cannot be seen or regarded as an interpretation and application of 
collective agreement, as one cannot have as such in terms of an employer’s privilege 
discretionally granted to employees. In the premise, the HOD’s discretion to grant or 
refuse application for temporary incapacity leave or ill-health retirement is exercised 
in terms of a Statute, neither is it part of a collective agreement. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
Attempts have been made in this study to examine the general principles of the 
employment contract; legislative framework applicable in the public-education sector 
in determining applications for temporary incapacity leave and ill-health retirement; 
and procedural and substantive issues in the termination of employment contracts 
due to ill-health.  The legal question emanating from the issue of a discretion 
exercised by the Head of Department in granting or declining applications for ill-
health was also examined.   
 
It can be deduced that the contract of employment remains of critical importance, 
because, except in some rare cases, the legislation that was dealt with in this study 
applies only to such parties who entered a contract of employment.  It has been 
indicated that the legal relationship between an employer and an employee is 
created by an agreement in terms of which the employee undertakes to place his/her 
personal services at the disposal of the employer for an indefinite or fixed period as 
well as for a determinable wage.  Once such an agreement has been concluded, the 
parties acquire certain rights and incur certain duties.  Failure by either party to 
perform its duties under the contract gives the other party the right to either enforce 
or cancel the contract.  However, every employee has the right not to be unfairly 
dismissed.  The Labour Relations Act recognizes three grounds on which termination 
of employment might be legitimate.  These include the conduct of the employee, the 
capacity of the employee and operational requirements of the employer’s business. 
 
A serious challenge faced by the Department of Education is the high volume of 
employees, particularly educators, taking long and unending sick leaves.  A close 
view has been taken at the legislative framework in determining applications for 
temporary incapacity leave and ill-health retirement.  The procedure to be followed by 
the employer when faced with incapacity of an educator due to ill-health or injury is 
set out in Schedule 1 to the Employment of Educators Act.  Item 3 of Schedule 1 of 
the Act imposes a duty on the employer to conduct an investigation concerning the 
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extent of the ill-health or injury that may be suffered by the educator.  In Holdin v 
Department of Education,79 the court held that there was no reason why failure by the 
employer to conduct an investigation as to the extent of the ill-health or injury could 
not find a cause of action.  The court went further to state that Schedule 1 to the 
Employment of Educators Act provided a procedural right to educators faced with 
incapacity not to perform their duties due to ill-health or injury.  The fact that the 
ultimate outcome of the investigation might be a dismissal did not detract from the 
duty of the employer to conduct an investigation or take away the right to acquire the 
employer to conduct investigation envisaged in terms of section 3 of Schedule 1 to 
the Employment of Educators Act.  It has to be noted that the fact that the 
investigation might confirm the incapacity due to ill-health did not mean that dismissal 
was an automatic outcome.  Even when in a case where investigation confirms the 
ill-health or injury as being permanent, dismissal is not automatic.  In that stance, the 
employer has the duty in terms of section 3(6) to investigate the possibility of 
securing alternative employment which may include amongst others a transfer which 
seemed to be one of the desires of an applicant in his/her case. 
 
In another matter in Jijana v Eastern Cape Department of Education,80 the court held 
that section 3(1) to the Act did no more than place an overarching obligation on the 
Department of Education to investigate the capacity of an employee in circumstances 
where it was of the view that the educator was not performing in accordance with 
post requirements that the educator had been employed to perform, as a result of 
poor health or injury or in circumstances where the educator applied to be discharged 
on the basis of ill-health.  This does not grant an individual employee a right to be 
investigated by his or her employer.  This right to be investigated in terms of the 
procedure as set out in section 3 only arose once the employer decided to invoke 
section 3, or once the educator had applied to be discharged.  Put differently, once 
the employer decided to investigate the employee’s ill-health, the employee had the 
right to insist that such investigation be done in accordance with procedures set out 
in that section.  
 
                                                          
79  (2011) P 603/09 ZA (LC). 
80  (2012) P 26/11 (LC). 
59 
It should also be recorded that a dismissal for incapacity must not only be justified, 
but the employer must also follow a fair procedure before taking the decision to 
dismiss the employee.  Procedural fairness is the yardstick by which the employer’s 
pre-dismissal actions are measured.  The two requirements of fairness are generally 
regarded as distinct: a substantive fair dismissal may be unfair because the employer 
has failed to follow a fair procedure.  Item 10 of the Code of Good Practice addresses 
the issue of substantive and procedural fairness, where dismissal is based on the 
employee’s incapacity due to illness or injury.  And Item 11 sets out the statutory 
guidelines for a dismissal arising from ill-health and injury. 
 
In some circumstances it may be necessary to distinguish disability and incapacity in 
determining the need to accommodate or the fairness of a dismissal.  It is becoming 
more difficult to make the distinction between which illnesses or injuries fall within the 
scope of the concept of ill-health absenteeism. If the illness or injury is deemed to be 
a disability, a greater onus is placed on the employer than merely fulfilling the 
requirements of an ill-health-incapacity process.   
 
Furthermore, it has been shown that temporary incapacity leave is a privileged 
category of special sick leave that may be granted by the relevant employer to public-
service employees in deserving cases only.  It is important for all employees to 
understand that temporary incapacity leave is not a basic condition of employment in 
terms of the Basic Condition of Employment Act, 1997 and it is furthermore not an 
employee’s right to be granted such a leave.  In fact, it is granted entirely and solely 
at the discretion of the Head of Department and is at the very least, conditional of a 
number of qualifying factors, before approval for such a leave is granted.  In the 
circumstances, the decision to decline temporary incapacity leave and ill-health 
retirement cannot be seen or regarded as an interpretation and application of 
collective agreement.  In the premise, the HOD’s discretion to grant or refuse 
application for temporary incapacity leave or ill-health retirement is exercised in terms 
of a statute and neither is it part of a collective agreement.  
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It should be mentioned that regarding the processing of applications for and the 
overall administration of rules of Incapacity Leave and Ill-Health Retirement, the 
following findings were made by the Public Service Commission:81 
 
 There is non-adherence to time frames for processing the applications by all 
parties involved in the process and implementation of Policy and Procedure 
and Ill-Heath Retirement in the Public Service, namely, employees, 
designated officials, Health-Risk Managers, and Heads of Departments. 
 
 Medical practitioners from private practices and public hospitals are generally 
reluctant to complete the temporary/permanent incapacity-leave forms when 
requested by employees, as they feel the forms are bulky and time-
consuming.  As a result, there are delays in submitting the forms by 
employees which cause further delays in the forwarding of the forms to the 
Health-Risk Managers.  In addition the Public Service Commission was 
informed that employees end up being charged an additional fee by some 
medical practitioners for the completion of the forms. 
 
 Some departments are not processing temporary/permanent incapacity leave 
applications that are submitted late by employees.  There is no indication as 
to what happens to such applications and how the employees and managers 
account for such absence.  There is also no indication of whom gives 
authorization for such practices. 
 
 The redeployment of employees as per Health-Risk Managers’ 
recommendations poses a serious challenge in the Public Service to 
accommodate some employees as a result of their ill-health and or disability. 
 
It is submitted as common cause that the Eastern Cape Department of Education in 
most cases has not adhered to time frames contemplated in the Policy and 
Procedure for Incapacity Leave and Ill-Health Retirement.  It is further argued that the 
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failure to conduct the necessary medical investigation as provided for in Policy and 
Procedure on Incapacity Leave and Ill-Health Retirement and Collective Agreements, 
and as well as the failure by the Department of Education to comply with time frames 
as set out in Resolution 7 of 2000, read together with PILIR and Leave 
Determination, is a serious cause for concern and reason for backlog in dealing with 
these cases. 
 
It becomes imperative before making recommendations to just once again highlight 
time frames as contemplated in PILIR and Collective Agreements.  An employee 
must submit a completed temporary incapacity leave form or ill-retirement form 
together with sufficient medical evidence that he/she is too ill to work satisfactorily,82 
and a medical certificate83 within 5 working days after the first day of absence.84 
 
The employer must verify that the form is completed and submit the Department’s 
report to the Health-Risk Manager within 5 working days and conditionally grant a 
maximum of 29 consecutive working days temporary incapacity leave.  The Health-
Risk Manager must acknowledge receipt within 2 working days and confirm that the 
employer will receive feedback within 12 working days.  The employer must within 30 
working days approve or refuse temporarily granted conditional leave.  
 
It is these time frames mentioned above that the employer on occasion fails to 
comply with.  Given the size of the employer, as the Eastern Cape Department of 
Education, it appears that these time frames are not achievable or rather are 
unrealistic.  
 
It is therefore recommended that the employer, through relevant forms, must propose 
an amendment in regard to the issue of time frames.  30 days have been proved to 
be ambitious and therefore a recommendation can be made to have these days 
extended to 60 days, to be precise.  Regarding time frames for the Health-Risk 
Manager to report to the employer, a period of 12 days should also be revisited. 
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In most cases, employees who apply for ill-health retirement go for examination by 
their medical experts.  It is therefore recommended that the Health-Risk Managers 
should as well refer such cases for a medical expert’s second-opinion evaluation.  In 
the case of employees who continue to submit sick certificates that are not accepted 
for the Temporary Incapacity Leave, it is recommended that the employer must 
decide whether to follow the Incapacity Code as provided in Schedule 1 to the 
Employment of Educators Act, read together with the LRA, or to terminate the 
employment contract due to ill-health. 
 
It should be emphasized that incapacity leave does not consist of an unlimited 
number of additional sick-leave days at an employee’s disposal; rather, it is additional 
sick leave granted conditionally at the employer’s discretion.  
 
It is worth recommending that it is high time for the Department of Education to 
invoke the provisions of section 3(8) of Schedule 1 to the Employment of Educators 
Act,85 where the employer is required to initiate and institute an incapacity hearing if 
the employer is of the view that the educator’s ill-health or injury is of a permanent 
nature.  In terms of these provisions the employer must convene an inquiry in order 
to give the educator the opportunity to make representations in response to the 
allegations against him or her, which shall include the right to – 
 
 call, examine and cross-examine witnesses; 
 
 bring all relevant documentation to the attention of the person presiding over 
the enquiry, and have access to documents produced in evidence by the 
employer; 
 
 be represented at the proceedings by a co-employee or trade-union 
representative; 
 
 have an interpreter present if the educator so requires; and 
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 lead all relevant evidence, including evidence in mitigation of sanction if 
necessary. 
 
If the educator’s ill-health or injury is of a permanent nature, it is only then that the 
employer will be required to investigate the possibility of – 
 
 securing alternative employment for the educator; 
 
 adapting the duties or work circumstances of the educator to accommodate 
the educator’s ill-health or injury; or 
 
 consider the termination of the educator’s service with effect from a date 
determined by the employer. 
 
In the Eastern Cape Department of Education there are challenges experienced by 
managers in handling temporary incapacity leave and ill-health-retirement 
applications.  Some of the challenges emanate from the principals’ inability in regard 
to submitting the necessary documentation timeously as required by law.  Failure by 
the employer to manage ill-health at the workplace has a potential to lead to 
allegations of unfair labour practices and other labour-law risks.  The only real 
challenge in this matter is that the Department of Education should distance itself 
from direct evaluation of incapacity and disability applications, and place such 
complex functions in the hands of independent experts.  In this regard the Health-
Risk Managers would make recommendations to the Head of Department who 
thereafter shall implement the recommendations by these Health-Risk Managers.  
 
In view of the above, in a normal set-up, the Head of Department would be supposed 
to have a committee which in turn will apply its mind to the recommendations of the 
Health-Risk Managers, and then deal with the issues of a case in such a way to 
reach absolute finality. 
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